Camus' Concept of Alienation by Ashai, Shabnam
CAMUS' CONCEPT OF ALIENATION 
DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD 
OF THE 
Mnittx of ^Ijilo^opI)? 
m 
PHILOSOPHY 
By 
SHABNAM ASHAI 
Under the Supervision of 
Prof. WAHEED AKHTAR 
Chairman Philosophy Departmant 
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSIiy 
ALIGARH (INDIA) 
1994 
CH£< '^* 'XD 
.002 
DS2908 
•;'^ ^ MI\DLIB9 
,,:0 No, 
1 8 0CT1997 
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH - 202002 (O.P.) 
INDIA 
DATED : 6^(2'W^ 
CERTIFICATE 
I certify that the M.Phil, dissertation entitled 
"Camus' Concept of Alienation", submitted by Ms 
Shabnam Ashai is her original research work and 
has been written under my supervision and 
guidance. 
Prof. Waheed Akhtar 
(Supervisor) 
Deptt. of Philosophy 
A.M.U., Aligarh (U.P.) 
DEDICATED 
TO 
MY SISTER 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
It is my profound previlege to express heartiest 
indebtness to my supervisor. Professor Waheed Akhtar, for 
his invaluable guidance and. helpful criticism. These words 
are the barest acknowledgement of all that I owe to him 
towards the completion of my research work, 
I am thankful to Dr. Sanaullah Mir, Lecturer, 
Department of Philosophy, A.M.U., who helped me in his 
generous way, whenever I needed advice, I could rely on 
him. 
The completion of this work has been greatly aided 
by the help and encouragement of Mr. Zubair Rizvi, 
Secretary Urdu Academy, Delhi and Mustafa Khwaja, Prof. 
Womens College, M.A. Road, Srinagar. 
I am most thankful to Mr. Pradeep Sharma who 
deserves appreciation for typing my dissertation carefully. 
(SHABNAM ASHAI) 
CAMUS' CONCEPT OF ALIENATION 
CHAPTER I: (Page 1-30) 
CONCEPT OF MAN IN HISTORICAL RETROSPECT: 
the approach of classical and modern western 
thinkers, mystics and sufis. 
CHAPTER II; (Page 31-61) 
THE PROBLEM OF ALIENATION. 
CHAPTER III (Page 62-94) 
CAMUS' CONCEPT OF STRANGER OR OUTSIDER. 
CHAPTER IV (Page ?;3-110) 
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF CAMUS' CONCEPT OF 
ALIENATION. 
CHAPTER I 
CONCEPT OF MAN IN HISTORICAL RETROSPECT 
"What is the nature of man"? is surely one of the 
most important questions of philosophy. For, whatever 
questions we raise regarding human situation depend 
ultimately on our view of human nature, the meaning and 
purpose of human life, what man ought to do and hopes to 
achieve etc., are fundamentally affected by whatever one 
thinks is the real or true nature of man. In the history of 
western thought, philosophers, scientists and men of 
letters have sought to know man, either with the dualistic 
hypothesis or with a monoistic hypothesis. The upholders of 
the dualistic hypothesis have suggested that man is the 
unity of two principal components i.e. body and spirit, 
which though they are logically independent are yet 
substantially united together as man. On the other hand, 
the upholders of the monoistic hypothesis considered the 
real nature of man either as purely spiritual or as purely 
material. 
In ancient Greece Pythagoras was probably the first 
philosopher to uphold a dualistic hypothesis for 
explaining the existence of man. For him and his followers 
man is a composite of body and soul. Soul being the eternal 
element while body is a temporal phenomenon. Pythagoras 
believed in transmigration of souls and he was of the view 
that man is an integral part of cosmos. The soul changes 
its bodily forms; sometimes it may appear in human form, 
sometime in animal form and sometime in plant form. He 
believed that purity was to be sought by silence, self-
examination, abstention from flesh, and the observence of 
other rituals which the pythagoras interpreted symbolically, 
For Plato and Aristotle also man is a composite 
2 being consituted by the elements of body and soul . In 
agreement with Pythagoras Plato was of the view that the 
soul is eternal and its original home is beyond space and 
time. Its presence in this world indicates a fall in state. 
For Plato reality consists of Ideas and these ideas are 
beyond space and time and they are eternal and unchanging. 
Soul actually belongs to that realm. The human soul in its 
fallen state on this earth aspires to reach out again to 
its original home, the realm of ideas. But at the same time 
it is bound by the body and its earthly needs often make it 
forget its real aspirations. So according to Plato there is 
a built-in tension in the human situation. On the one hand 
human spirit aspires to fly but on the other hand its 
bodily weight pulls it down to earth. 
What is the true nature of man? Replies Aristotle, 
"We see it clearest in the most intellectual and most 
3 
highly socialized life of man" . Differently expressed, man 
is by nature intellectual and social; and therefore the 
ideal life is the life of the philosopher, the life of the 
citizen in a free city-state and the life of friendship. 
For Aristotle every entity of this universe is composed of 
matter and form; form being the actuality and matter being 
the possibility. So far as man is concerned we can say that 
soul is the form of man and according to Aristotle every 
object in this universe aims to achieve its true form. So 
we can say that according to Aristotle the evolution of a 
man consists in actualizing his true form i.e. his soul. 
Aristotle also was of the view that a man cannot realize 
his true form in a state of loneliness. A man needs the 
company of other men in order to realize his true self. 
That is why Aristotle called man a social animal. But by 
virtue of being a social animal man is also a political 
animal according to Aristotle. Here again we can discern 
that there is a tension built-in the very structure of man. 
On the one hand man is supposed to realize, actualize his 
own particular true form but on the other hand he is 
required to seek the help and assistence of others for 
doing the same . 
For Epicurs human organism is composed of atoms 
undergoing characteristic patterns of change. Like all 
other atomic compounds man came into being when the 
necessary conditions have been met. He has no creator and 
no destiny. His good is pleasure, his highest good is a 
life of secure and lasting pleasure. According to him men 
are not united by any natural bond, they form alliances for 
mutual advantage . 
Coming to modern times; for Descartes man is a 
composite of body and mind. Both these elements are, as per 
tradition, conceived to be totally different from one 
another, the attribute of mind being thought, and the 
attribute of body being extension. He was of the opinion 
that a disembodied mind can exist on its own. But the 
problem with the cartesian idea is how can two essentially 
different things like body and mind be united? Descartes 
somehow comes out with a solution that is definetly 
unsound. He says that the two are related via pineal gland 
in the brain . Notwithstanding the unsoundness of cartesian 
solution, we can discern again that there is a built-in 
tension in the very structure of the human being. The needs 
of the mind and demands of the body are definitly at 
variance with each other. And the problem is how to balance 
and harmonise the two. 
John Locke distinguishes the concept of man from 
the concept of person. A man according to Locke is a 
certain sort of living organism whose identity depends on 
its biological organisation. On the other hand, he defined 
a person as "A thinking Intelligent being, that has reason 
and reflection and can consider itself as itself at,different 
times and places; which it does only by that consciousness 
7 
which is inseperable from thinking and essential to it" . A 
person according to Locke is a morally responsible agent. 
Locke thought, that what makes people accountable for their 
actions is their ability to recognise them as their own. 
This means two things: first, an awareness of what one is 
doing when one is doing it and, second, an ability to 
remember having done it. Hence, he said that the criterion 
for the identity of persons, as distinct from men is 
consciousness, a concept intended to embrass both awareness 
and memory. Henc<» we discern a tension between these two 
concepts, man and person. 
For Neitzche man has no supernatural dignity. Man's 
dignity is not a pregiven fact but a goal that few 
approach. There is no meaning in life except the meaning 
man gives to his life, and the aims of most men have no 
surpassing dignity. To raise ourselves above the senseless 
flux, we must cease being merely human. We must be hard 
against ourselves and overcome ourselves; we must become 
creators instead of remaining mere creatures. For Neitzche 
human evolution is possible only through, "Suffering, being 
forsaken, profound self contempt, the torture of mistrust 
g 
of himself and the misery of him who is overcome" . He is 
of the view that there is no other way in which one can 
attain or prove one's worth. 
In this regard Ortega y Gasset has rightly pointed 
out: 
The select man is not the petulant person who 
thinks himself superior to the rest, The most 
radical division that is possible to make of humanity is 
that which splits it into two classes of creatures: Those 
who make great ^^mands of themselves, pilling up 
difficulties and duties; and those who demand nothing 
special to themselves, but for whom to live is to be every 
moment what they already are, without imposing on 
themselves any effort towards perfection; mere buoys that 
float on the waves. 
Thus we see that human condition for Neitzche is to 
be torn by strife and a perpetual struggle and flight 
against one self. Thus alienation is a structural feature 
of man. 
To Marx, man is destined to work for his 
bio-physical survival and for the fulfilment of his other 
needs. Production is therefore the most important of all 
man's activities. Man in association with other men 
produces more than man in isolation and society is thus the 
result of man's attempt to secure the necessities of life 
most efficiently. But, society has never accomplished that 
to the satisfaction of all its members and has, in 
consequence, always been subject to internal stresses and 
strains or subject to division into oppressors and the 
oppressed. Thus in Marx's view^ man's becoming are 
exclusively the result of his existential socio-economic 
relativeness. 
Marx holds that in the captalist form of society, 
man gets alienated from his own true nature, since the 
conditions of the captalist society do not allow man to 
develop his real potential. Thus, in his opinion there can 
be no real change in the individual's life until there is a 
radical change in society and unless the socio-economic 
system of capitalism is topsy-turveyed. And Marx thinks 
that this is bound to happen one day, for capitalism will 
wither away because of its inner contradictions and the 
communist revolutionary will bring in the new order of 
things in which alienation will disappear, man will be 
regenerated in his true nature, his potential will 
develop for its own sake and the guiding principle in the 
way and view of life will be '''each according to 
his ability to each according to his needs". In short 
Marx's man is primarly an economic being and solution to 
man's all problems and all his sufferings consists in 
restructuring the economic set up. He held that human state 
is constituted by its material sustenance - "Man is what he 
eats"^. 
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Freud tried to build a complete picture of man by 
working on'- an analysis of his unconscious 
urges and impulses. Freud's basic thesis is that, nothing 
which a person does or says is realy haphazard or 
accidential; everything can, in principle, be traced to 
causes which are somehow in the person's mind . Freud 
postulated three kinds of man's mental states viz. 
'conscious' i.e. different kinds of our experiences and 
memories of which we are usually aware; 'unconscious' i.e. 
certain kinds of our experiences which cannot become 
conscious in normal circumstances and 'preconscious' i.e. 
memories of particular experiences or of particular facts, 
of which we are not continually conscious, but which we can 
call to mind whenever necessary. Freud also postulated 
three major structural systems with the human mind or 
personality; the id, which contains all the instinctual 
drives seeking immediate satisfaction, the ego, which deals 
with the real world outside the person, mediating between 
it and id and the superego, a special part of the ego which 
contains the conscience and the social norms acquired in 
child-hood. 
Freud further holds that the becoming of a normal 
human person depends on a harmonious relationship between 
the various parts of the mind, and between the person and 
the real world in which he has to live. The ego has to 
reconcile id. Super-ego and the external world, perceiving 
and choosing opportunities for satisfying the instinctual 
demands of the Id without transgressing the standards 
required by the super-ego. If the world is unsuitable and 
does not give any opportunities for satisfaction of the 
instinctual demands, there will be mental disturbances and 
hence man's sufferings. So, becoming of imperfect 
individuals, in Freud's opinion, result from the 
repression or frustration of basic instincts. And, the 
prime basic instinct according to Freud is sex or lust. 
However, he widened the concept of sexuality as pleasent 
experience derived through any part of the body; even 
love, sympathy, liking etc. And, finally, he held that, 
for normal and mature development it is essential that 
each child passes through the normal stages of development 
of sexuality. Evidently, in Freud's view, man's becoming 
is primarly governed by his basic instinct of sex. 
For Dostoyevsky man is limited by society, 
economic conditions, laws, history, the church and 
especially by god. He is classified, defined and fixed by 
a hundred institutions and a thousand conditions. Man, 
however does not want to be defined and limited, he wants 
to be free and he wants to be totally free. According to 
Dostoyvesky he is right in wanting to be free, for freedom 
is the essential attribute of his identity. 
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Dostoyevsky's free man must be a revolutionary. He 
must refuse what society, economics, religion, other 
people, and his own past have made of him . Golyadkin, 
the hero of the early tale The Double (1846), refuses to 
be what society and economic conditions and his own acts 
have made of him: a civil servant of a certain rank, 
living on Shestilavochnaya street with a servant named 
Petrushka; someone not poor and not rich; something of a 
bootlicker, a bit of hypocrite, and a social bore. He 
revolts against this Golyadkin by creating a double. By 
giving all his undesirable traits to the double, he is 
able to make in his mind a new identity: good, brave, 
intelligent and heroic. The Golyadkin others see is a 
mistake; the Golyadkin he cries in his mind is the true 
one: when the two come into conflict, he defends unto 
madness his freedom to reject what the past and conditions 
have made of him and his right to create himself. 
However this freedom implies a complex and 
terrible truth about the actions of men and their 
treatment of others. If there are no laws to one's nature-
and there cannot be if one is to be free - than man alone 
is his own law. And if he is his own end, he will make 
everything else serve that end, including other people. 
Even more, every a — priori truth becomes illusion. 
Otherwise, the truth would be prior to other choices and 
11 
our choices would be determined by it. Truth as something 
absolute, timeless, and pre-existent to our choices is 
impossible in Dostoyevesky's concept of freedom. Truth, 
like everything else in his world depends on our wills. 
The implications of this are terrifying; every action of 
principle, every act of unselfishness, every good, 
beautiful, virtuous, reasonable act is so only in 
appearance. No matter how much naive and tender romantic 
souls may want to believe in them, they are really 
deceptions, for the reality is man's free will and he is 
deadly duel with other free wills. 
The total freedom of underground man brought 
Dostoyeveskey to the total, terror of a universe without 
truth or principle, good or evil, virtue or vice. This 
nihilistic vision of the universe was to send philosophers 
like L.I. Shestov and Neitzche into dark ecstasy over the 
naked power of the will, and it was also to bring 
Dostovesky to what seemed to be an irresolvable dilemma. 
Freedom is the supreme good because man in not man unless 
he is free, but freedom is also the supreme evil because 
man is free to do anything, including illimitable 
destruction. 
For Heidgger human being exists as anticipation of 
its own possibilities: it exists in advance of itself and 
12 
grasps its situation as challenge to its own power of 
becoming what it may, rather than being what it must be. 
Man is always reaching out beyond himself; his very being 
consists in aiming at what he is not yet. Such a project 
of himself never outruns the boundaries of the world he 
has been given: it is a projection in and off and with the 
world. For Heidgger human existence is a shared existence. 
"I am constituted both by my preoccupations in which I 
make use of objects as tools and by my solicitude of 
12 persons" . For him self and world are inseperable. In its 
own projection, then, man at once understands his world 
and becomes himself. However, if the world is the material 
for his creative energy, it is also the agent by which he 
is seduced from the essential drive to understand and 
create. Man is not only the world, in this creative effort 
he loses himself to the world. According to Heidegger, 
foreflight is a fundamental attribute of human being. It 
means the scattering of the essential forward drive 
through attention to the distracting and disturbing cares 
of every day and of the things and people that surround us 
every-day. Thus the forward driving, "I" is sacrificed to 
the persistent and pressing "They". Man, for Heidegger in 
its everyday mode is public; it is life with others and 
for others, in alienation from the central task of 
becoming oneself. Thus man is determined yet free, free 
13 
yet enslaved. It is not the case that only heredity and 
environment make man, these are conversly what man makes 
of them. Freedom lives in the tension of history, in the 
challenge of man's situation, his body, his family, his 
country. But freedom lives equally in the tension of the 
unhistorical, the purely present - the passing mood, the 
flight of the self from itself. 
To Sartre man is free as he cannot be otherwise. 
He cannot escape his freedom, which becomes for him, 
therefore, a dreadful responsibility. But not only does 
one determine himself in his free choice; he also 
determines all others for every decision he makes 
13 legislates for all men . Man is involved inevitably in 
anguish because his decision is never grounded in an 
external authority upon which he can rest the 
responsibility for his action. He must bear it alone. And 
when Sartre says alone, for not only is there no God to 
share the burden, but there is no structure a priori for 
values to rest upon. Man's forlorness is his all aloneness 
in which he must face the issue of his own freedom. That 
God does not exist is a dreadful fact that makes an 
ultimate difference to the world and to man. 
The discovery that there is no God and that man is 
alone is the beginning of a genuine humanism that 
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dignifies man as the free creator of all values and of 
whatever meaning there is in human existence. Sartre 
holds: "There is no human nature which can be taken as 
foundational. Man is nothing else but what he purposes, he 
exists only, in so far as he realises himself; he is 
therefore, nothing else but the sum of his actions, 
14 
nothing else but what his life is" 
He asserts that: "What man needs is to find 
himself again and to understand that nothing can save him 
from himself, ncc even a valid proof of the existence of 
God"-"-^ . 
For Iqbal too existence is a continuous process 
and not a system. His philosophy is based upon a theory of 
man. He regards human existence as an open reality. Iqbal 
agrees with the existentialists that the traditional 
philosophy has failed to grasp the very reality of human 
existence because of its intellectualistic analytical 
approach. Man is unanalysable, unpredictable and free, 
always an open possibility. His philosophy maintains that 
man is never complete. 
"Take this message from me to the Sufis: Ye are 
seeking God through the subtleties of thought; I shall 
serve as a slave the man who worships himself and who sees 
God in the light of his own personality" 
15 
Iqbal holds that man is the goal of lifes carvan. 
He is self-contained, centre of activity, creative and 
self-evolving. In defiance of God, Iqbal's man is destined 
to be a rival creator addressing 'The best of all 
creators': 
Thou didst create the night and I made the lamp. 
Thou didst create clay and I made the cup. 
Thou didst create the deserts, moutains and 
forests. 
I produced the orchards, gardens and groves; 
It is I who turn stone into a mirror. 
17 And it is I who turn poison into an antidote 
Iqbal emphasises two essential attributes of man 
viz. freedom and creativity. He also touched the problem of 
two fold alienation - God alienated from man and man 
alienated from God. In 'Shikwa' (The complaint), Iqbal had 
already raised the same issue: why is man alienated from 
God? In 'Jawab-e-Shikwa' (Answer to the complaint) Gods 
reply seems to be not satisfactory, because alienation is 
not God's problem; it is exclusively human problem. Iqbal 
considered it an opportunity to unfold man's all 
possibilities and develop all his potentialities. It was 
for him, freedom and creativity that urged man to leave 
the inert static life of heaven, devoid of all passions 
16 
and activities. Hence social life is not opposed to 
religious life, but an integral part of it. Social and 
religious experiences form the totality of human 
existence. It is due to this approach that Iqbal could 
meet the challenge of social meaninglessness and religious 
alienation simultaneously on the level of existential 
experiences. 
Man evolves his own world, creates his own 
values. If the present world renders no meaning to human 
existence, it is to be destroyed and reshaped: 
Smash the world into pieces if it does not suit 
thee; And bring forth another world from the 
depths of thy being. It is irritating for a free 
18 
man to live in a world made by others 
Iqbal holds that: 
In the higher Sufism of Islam unitive experience 
is not the finite ego effacing its own identity by some 
sort of absorption into the infinite eg; it is rather the 
19 infinite passing into the loving embrace of the finite 
Finitude is not a misfortune. Islam does not teach 
20 
complete liberation from finitude . Man is the trustee of 
21 
a free personality at his peril . Freedom is man's own 
choice. He is neither condemned to be free, nor does he 
17 
receive freedom as a gift from the transcendence. To Iqbal 
God speaks through freedom. He does not regard a slave's 
prayer as genuine, because a slave is not free to 
communicate with God. Prayer is the means to attain 
immortality. Only a free being can transcend space-time 
limits. Freedom means self-transcendence, to be what a man 
is not at present. It is creativity. 
Iqbal holds that being is always individual, their 
is not universal being. By being he means life of ego. 
Augustine recognizes three planes of being: body, 
soul and God. As soul controls body, so does God control 
22 the soul, to what He is m the closest proximity . For 
Saint Augestine man's evidence for knowing that he himself 
exists functions as a pre-condition. According to him, man 
can Soundly affirm his own existence on the ground of the 
famous formula, repeated in one form or another in several 
of his works. Si faller, sum, "If I am deceived, I 
exist". 
Through the inner empirical method, man can 
realize that he possesses reason and that this possession 
makes him superior to inorganic beings, plants and 
animals. Also through inner empricism man can not only 
recognise his own mutability, but can as well realize the 
existence of the immutable and unchanging; that which is 
18 
superior to himself. Saint Augestine cannot see in this 
truth anything other than God, who has granted men these 
inner powers, this Divine illumination, whereby God 
himself can be known, and all the complex relations of the 
creation can be understood. Thus the mind can know that 
God is the creator of the "natures" which can be perceived 
in the world of sense-experience and they in turn can be 
dealt with in their true character, because inner 
experience with its guarantee of Divine illumination makes 
it possible for the mind to view them on their proper 
lights 
To Augestine man's free will is the source of 
man's imperfection but man was capable of being perfect. 
Man, not God is responsible; and he is so, even if God 
24 forsaw that free man would sin 
Man has fallen, and with man's fall evil has 
entered the world. In Adam all men sinned, i.e. Adam's sin 
was not a mere event in the life of one man but was a 
cosmic revolution, a world rebelling against its creator. 
With the fall man was lost. Man is lost and no human power 
can save him. Left to himself, man can but sin, for his 
true freedom has gone. God alone can save man by His 
grace. Man must be redeemed and God alone can redeem him. 
The world is evil and is lost; men are evil still, 
hundreds of /ears after the Chirst has come. Such is not 
19 
the divine plan. God chooses whom he shall save and whom 
he shall leave to their sin. But is not salvation free to 
all to choose or not to choose ? No; man cannot even choose 
to be saved, for man is hopelessly corrupt. If he is saved, 
it is all Gods will. The agent by which this salvation is 
consummated is the grace of God working through the church. 
Without the church there is no means of salvation. Thus the 
church is conceived not as a society within the world but 
as a wonderful cosmic entity coming from God having supreme 
control over the destiny of man. It is thus superior to the 
state and to all other human institutions. It is the city 
of God descended from heaven. The church and the angels 
constitute the great intermediary between the ultimate God 
and the cosmos; and they thus correspond to the 
intermediary powers and stages believed in by the whole 
intellectual world of the Greco-Roman period. 
For Augastine the choice for a man was always 
between a life of detached action or an over-indulgence 
into the ways of flesh and carnel desires. One was the life 
of heroic withdrawl and consequent self-exaltation and 
redemption while the other was the life of slavery of lust 
and sensual pleasure. The antipodal stations of life could 
be expressed by any of the contrasting terms like 'City of 
God' and "City of Earth or City of Rome and City of 
20 
Jerusalam etc." While elaborating on the significance of 
these dichotomoies, at one place he movingly wrote : 
"....ye have heard and know that there are two 
cities, for the present outwardly mingled together, yet 
separated at heart, running together through the course of 
time until the end; one whose end is everlasting peace, 
and it is called Jerusalam; the other whose joy is peace in 
the world, and is called Babylon. The meaning of these 
names too ye remember, that Jerusalam means 'vision of 
peace'; Babylon, 'confusion'. Jerusalam was held capitive 
in Babylon, but not all, for the Angels too are its 
citizens. But as regards men predestined to the glory of 
God...which began thus : 
For thee, 0 God, a hymn is meet in Sion, and to 
thee shall the vow be performed in Jerusalam. 
But today we have sun. By the waters of Babylone we 
sat down and wept, when he remembered Sion. Observe, 
that in the former it is said, For thee, 0 God, a 
hymn is meet in Sion; but here, by the waters of 
Babylon we sast down and wept, when we remembered 
25 Sion, that Sion where a hymn is meet for God. 
According to Ibn 'Arabi', man consists of three 
elements : Spirit, soul and body. The three aspects of the 
soul are the rational, vegetative and animal. The rational 
soul Ibin 'Arabi seems to identify with spirit or the 
21 
rational principle in man. The purpose of the vegetative 
soul is to seek food and to assimilate it. The animal soul 
has its seat in the physical heart and is shared by man and 
animals. It represents their vital principle. Both 
vegetative and animal soul Ibn 'Arabi regards as part of 
the body. The rational soul, on the other hand, is 
independent of the body, even though it uses it as a 
vehicle. It is 'that perfect and simplest substance which 
is living and active, the substance whose sole activities 
are remembering, retaining ideas, comprehending, discrimi-
nating and reflecting. 
Viewed superfically, Ibn 'Arabi's division into 
spirit and body (rationality and animality) might wear a 
look of dualism. In actual fact both spirit and body are, 
for him, facets of the same central Reality, one being its 
inward, the other its outward aspect. 
Actually Ibn 'Arabi transformed Hallaj's theory of 
incarnation which states that "God created Adam in his own 
image". He distinguished between two natures of man : the 
divine (al-lahut) and the human (al-nasut). The two nature 
are not united but fused, the one into the other, as wine 
is fused into water. The Hallajian idea was given a wider 
application by Ibn Arabi. First, the duality of lahut and 
Nasut became a duality of aspects of one reality, not of 
22 
two independent natures. Secondly they were regarded as 
actually present not only in man but in everything 
whatever; the Nasut being the external aspect of a thing, 
the lahut, its internal aspect. But God who reveals Himself 
in all phenomenal existence is revealed in a most perfect 
and complete way in the form of the perfect man, who is 
best represented by prophets and saints. 
So man in general-and the perfect man in particular 
is the most perfect manifestation of God. The universe 
which, like a mirror, reflects the divine attributes and 
names in a multiplicity of forms, manifests them 
separately. Man alone manifests these attributes and names 
collectively. Hence he is called the microcosm and the 
honoured epitome (al-mukhtasar al-Sharif) and the most 
universal being (al-Kaun al Jami) who comprises all 
realities and grades of existence. In him alone the divine 
presnece is reflected, and through him alone God become 
conscious of_ himself and his perfection. 
Ibn 'Arabi says : 
"God, glory to Him, in respect of His most 
beautiful names, which are beyond enumeration, willed to 
see their a' yan (realities), or if you wish you may say. 
His (own) 'ayn, in a universal Being which contains the 
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whole affair in as much as it is endowed with all aspects 
of existence and through which (alone) His mystery is 
revealed to Himself : for a vision which consists in a 
thing seeing itself by means of itself is not the same as 
that of the thing seeing something else which serves as 
a mirror... .Adam v/as the very essence of the polishing of 
this mirror, and the spirit of this form (i.e., the form in 
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which God has revealed Himself : which is man)" 
Man deserves the high honour and dignity of being 
God's vicegerent on earth - a rank which God has denied 
all other creatures including the angels. This superior 
rank goes not to every individual man, for some men are 
even lower than the beasts, but to the perfect man alone, 
and this for two resons : 
a) He is perfect manifestation of God in virtue of 
unity in himself, of all God's attributes and names. 
b) He knows God absolutely through realizing in some 
n Q 
sort of experience his essential oneness with him. 
According to Buddha, the idea of self is an 
imaginary, false belief which has no corresponding reality 
and it produces harmful thoughts of 'me' and 'mine', 
selfish desire, craving, attachement, hatred, ill-health, 
conceit, pride, egoism and other defilements, impurities, 
and problems. It is the source of all troubles in the 
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world from personal conflicts to wars between nations. In 
short, to this false view can be traced all the evil in the 
world. 
The Buddhist doctrine of anatta, with the rejection 
of the notion of the immortal soul within man, serves to 
dispel the illusion of the egocentric 'I', which is, as 
Buddha taught, the root cause of all evil. To Buddha "There 
is no self in man, however spelt or described, which is 
unchanging and his alone". The self or soul exists as a 
convenient concept to describe an ever-changing bundle of 
characteristics, each the product of innumerable past 
causes, which moves in the illusion of time towards 
29 Nirvana . The Buddha analysed the components of 
personality and proved each to be empty. In the first place 
Buddhism examines the various aspects of the so called 
person (Puggata) and contends, by minutely analysing them, 
that none of them can be identified with the atman, and 
that no atman can be found when the person is so analysed. 
The person is first analysed under two categories : 
Nama and Rupa.Nama (literally Name), is usually translated 
into English by the word 'mind', but in Buddhist psychology 
it is used as a collective name to refer to the 
psychological and mental aspects of human being. Rupa 
(literally form), translated into English by the word 
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(matter, body), is also a collective term to describe the 
physical aspect of being. Thus Namarputa (Name and Form) 
taken together comprise the psychophysical i^rganism which 
constitutes a person as a separate and distinct individual. 
It is extremely important to note that Buddhism 
does not think of Nama and Rupa in dualistic terms. They 
are interdependent and belong to each other in an integral 
manner. One cannot exist without the other- The idea is 
expressed in the following verse : 
As a pair are mind and body both 
To one another a support; 
As soon as one of them dissoslves, 
The other too does disappear 
As men are able with a ship 
To cross the waters of the sea, 
Just so supported by this body 
The mind keeps going on and on. 
And just as with the help of men 
The ship may cross the mighty sea 
Just so supported by the mind 
The body may be keeping on. 
As men and ship traverse the sea. 
Depending on each other's help. 
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So are the mind and body too. 
Each other they support and help. 
The division of man into the two categories, Nama 
and Rupa, is only the first step in the Buddhist analysis 
of self. The next step is the analysis of man into the five 
Khandhas (aggregation). This is the classic 'thervada 
pancakkhandha' theory, according to which the individual 
consists of (1) Rupa, (2) Vedana, (3) Sanna, (4) Samkhara 
and (5) Vinnana. The last four are sub-divisions of Nama. 
Altogether there are eighty-one basic elements with 
the addition of the element of space (Akaso) which is 
counted as one of the rupa elements. None of these elements 
is permanent. Hence there is no soul, when the five 
aggregates come together they take a certain form and what 
is thus formed is given a name. Thus we have 'name and 
form' (nama-rupa) but when the elements disintegrate there 
is no nama-rupa, no person, no ego. 
Regarding the impersonality and emptiness of the 
five aggretages it is said : 
Whatever there is of corporeality, feeling, 
perception, mental formation and consciousness, whether 
past, present or future, one's own or external, gross or 
subtle, lofty or low, far or near; this, one should 
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understand according to reality and true wisdom : This does 
not belong to me, This I am not, this is not my Ego. 
However, besides the above discussed conflicting 
theories, on concept of man, there are certain systems of 
belief e.g., Christanity, Islam, Hinduism etc., which are 
embodied in man's ways of living in different parts of the 
world. They being practically lived and adopted, are thus 
more than mere theories. These systems of belief claim 
essential truth about human nature e.g. Christianity holds 
that man is made in the im?ge of God. For each man is free 
to accept or reject God's purpose and will be judged 
according to how he exercises this freedom. To the question 
as to why God created man, Christianity answers that God 
willed not to be alone. He wanted to realise His essence 
i.e. love in meeting with another being, man, through its 
own free love. To account for man's sufferings and problems, 
Christanity says that the world is not in accordance with 
God's purpose, that man's relationship to God is disrupted. 
Man misuses his freedom, he rejects God and is thus 
infected with Sin. 
On the other hand, in Indian culture there are 
various trends on concept of man. The Charvakas, for 
example, like materialists, hold that man is a bio-physical 
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entity, who has evolved from matter. In their opinion, 
enjoyment of pleasure is the only sensible purpose of life. 
Mahayana Buddhism (Vijnanavadins) treats 'consciousness' as 
the metaphysical essence of man, whereas to the Hinayana 
school, man is aggregate of five Skandhas i.e. Sensation, 
consciousness, Name, mpression and Form. However, other 
schools of Indian Philosophy along with Jainism regard man 
as a unity of two sides i.e. the 'Natural' and the 
'spiritual'. By 'natural' is meant the biophysical and 
psychological processes stemming from the body-mind complex 
and the 'spiritual', the real essence of man which is 
self-explanatory. Further, man as a unity of these two 
sides, has been understood as characterised by the unique 
'I' - feeling'. This unreflective 'I feeling' explains 
man's identification with the body-mind complex and things 
of the external world. 
According to Indian thought the basic factor behind 
man's coming into wordly existence and becoming of a 
certain kind of human person, is his own Karmas of the past 
lives and of the present life. There is a two-fold 
fructification of all Karmas in man's life. Firstly every 
action performed with a desire produces its direct results; 
the direct results of our past Karmas is that, they 
determine the nature of birth, family, society, position 
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etc. In this case there is no choice. But, our past deeds 
also produce indirect results in us i.e. tendencies or 
dispositions, (Sanskaras or Vasans) which promote us to act 
in certain ways. But, they do not compel. They may be 
checked and controlled. Thus, according to Indian 
religiophilosophical thought, inspite of the initial 
determination of man's present life, man can make attempts 
to shape himself as he wills. 
Islamic philosophy of man is also set within 
Semitic frame-work. The Quran maintains that man has been 
created with a view to realize certain values and 
standards, the fore-most value being man's complete 
surrender to the will of Allah. Allah created man in His 
own image. He inducted His own spirit into a clay model and 
thus the most conscious and self-conscious agent viz. Man 
was created. Allah is nearer to man than his own jugular 
vein. Man was preciesly created to celebrate the praises of 
Almightly Allah and thus achieve highest spiritual 
excellence and felicity. Man has to go through trails and 
tribulations but he must not dispair of the mercy of God. 
Ultimately it is the believer in Allah who is really 
successful and on the day of judgement, he will be 
judiciously and graciously rewarded by His creator and 
Master i.e. Allah. 
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As a whole, what may be concluded from the above 
discussion is that the Dharma-centric theories of the 
traditional thinkers are as mistaken as the Kama-centric 
theory of Freud and the Artha-centric theory of Marx in 
understanding the nature of man. These approaches are 
limited and fail to understand man in his total 
perspective. They try to understand man from the same 
single aspect i.e. of the nature of Kama or Artha or Dharma 
or from some metaphysical presuppositions and as a result, 
their conclusions veil not only other dimensions of man but 
also the wholeness of man. These theories at the most, 
attempt to give a description of what man is, they do not 
take into account all dimensions of man and more 
particularly, the aspiring dimension of man i.e. what man 
wants to be or seeks to be. But then, any theory of human 
nature, if it is true to itself, has to be a theory of 
human life, not of one part, or one aspect of life. Neither 
can it be a mere logical postulation or speculation of an 
individual life or of human species. It has to be a 
complete explanation of the human mode of being and 
existence. 
CHAPTER 
THE PROBLEM OF ALIENATION 
Man has never been such a problem to himself as in 
the present age. Rocketting through space and on the point 
of conquering the heavens, he is fast loosing touch with his 
own world. The deepest problems of modern life justify the 
claim of an individual to preserve the autonomy and 
individuality of his existence in the face of overwhelming 
social forces, historical heritage, cultural ethos and above 
all technocentric life-world. The flight with nature which 
primitive man has to wage for his bodily existence attains 
in this modern form its latest transformation. The 
eighteenth century called upon man to free himself of all 
historical bonds in politics and religion and in morals and 
economics. In additoin to greater liberty, the ninteenth 
centry demanded the functional specialization of man and his 
work. This specialization makes one individual incomparable 
to another, and each of them indispensable to the highest 
possible extent. 
Our present age of pessimism, despair and 
uncertainty succeeds a quite different earlier period of 
optimism, hope and certainty - a period when man believed in 
himself and the v/ork of his hands; had faith in the powers 
of reason and science, trusted his gods, and conceived his 
own capacity for growth as endless and his widening horizons 
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limitless. Bold in his desires of freedom, equality, social-
justice and brotherhood, he imagined that ignorance alone 
stood in the way of these desires. But conflict of emotions 
and violence have unseated these traditional beliefs and 
values. Knowledge has spread, but it has not abolished 
warfare; nor has it made all men brothers. Instead, men find 
themselves more isolated, anxious and uneasy than 
ever. 
Confused as to his place in the scheme of a world 
growing each day closer yet more impersonal, more densely 
populated yet in face to face relations more dehumanized; a 
world appealing ever more widely for his concern and 
sympathy with unknown masses of men, yet fundamentally 
alienating him even from his next neighbour, today man has 
become mechanized, made comfortable as an object but in the 
profound sense displaced and thrown off balance as a 
subjective creator and power. Modern man is neither 
nostalgic to his past nor optimistic about future; he is 
just dissatisfied with 'present' - i.e. every thing that 
makes up his ethos - his philosophy and science, his 
religion and technology, his politics and ethics etc. He is 
disoriented, uncommitted, cynical, hopless and what not. 
This entire cluster of modern attiudes is what we call 
ALIENATION. The word alienation has an ancient history, 
being used in common discourse to identify feelings of 
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estrangement, or of detachment from self and from others; 
and in law to describe the act of transferring property or 
ownership to another. Actually the term alienation implies a 
subject and an object - the former being a constant and the 
latter being a variable. The subject, i.e., the alienated, 
individual and the object what one is alienated from, that 
may be an individual's self, another person,any institution, 
the whole society or cosmos or even God. 
In modern terms> however, "Alienation" has been 
used by philosophers, psychologists men of literature and 
sociologists to refer to an extraordinary variety of 
psycho-social disorders; including loss of self-anxiety 
states, psychosis despair, depersonalization 
rootlessness, apathy, social disorganization, loneliness, 
atomization, powerlessness, meaninglessness, isolation, 
pessimism and the loss of beliefs or values. Theologians and 
philosophers warn that advances in scientific knowledge do 
not enable us to penetrate the mystery of Being and do not 
bridge but often widen the gulf between the knowner and the 
reality he tries to understand; psychiatrists try to help 
their patients return from the world of illusion to reality; 
critics of the increasing mechanization of life challenge 
the optimistic expectation that technological progress 
will automatically lead to the enrichment of human lives; 
political scientists note that even democratic institutions 
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have failed to bring about genuine participation by the 
2 
masses in the great issues of our period. 
Whatever the approach, central to definition of 
alienation is the idea that man has lost his identity or 
"Selfhood". Many writers who deal with the problems of 
self-alienation assume that in each of us there is a 
"genuine", "real" or "spontaneous" self which we are 
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prevented from knowing or achieving. But how does one 
achieve selfhood? The most satisfactory answer has been 
provided by Social Psychologists, notably Charles H. Cooley 
and George H. Mead, who argued that one acquires a self or 
identity through interaction with others- Cooley called this 
a process of acquiring a "looking-glass self" and Mead 
termed it "taking the role of the other". But if one 
acquires a self by communicating with others, especially 
through language, then anxiety about or loss of self-hood is 
a social as well as an individual problem. What this means 
is that the person who experiences self-alienation is not 
only cut off from the springs of which he would otherwise be 
a part, and who fails to achieve a meaningful relationship 
with others but he is deprived of some jjart of himself. 
Simmel, who has considerably influenced 
contemporary philosophy and sociology both in Europe and in 
the United States, has expressed in his works the mood of 
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skepticism which arose in the first decades of this 
century. His essay "Der Konflikt der Modernen Kultur" 
reflects the growing fear - in our day reiterated by the 
existentialists - that man cannot be himself, that he is 
destined to remain a stranger in the world in which he 
lives. 
According to Siramel, an inner conflict, stemming 
from the antagonism between life and form, can be seen in 
the development of most civilizations. The creative movement 
of life in a civilization tends to express itself in law, 
technology, art, science and religion. Although the purpose 
of these expressions is to implement and to protect the life 
which engendered them, they reveal an immanent tendency to 
follow a direction, independent of and divorced from the 
energies of life which brought them into being. At the 
moment of their emergence they might correspond to the life 
which created them; but as they unfold they appear to fall 
into stubborn disconnection, even into a state of 
opposition. They are bound to become rigid, to stand by 
themselves. Thus they tend to acquire continuity in a word 
they become Forms. 
Without these forms the creative life could not 
have become manifest. It continuously produces them. Yet it 
keeps on flowing like a ceaseless stream, forever 
engendering new forms but immediately opposing them in their 
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solidity and permanence. Thus, rapidly or slowly, the 
energies of life gnaw at every cultural formation, once it 
has emerged. As one formation evolves its successor develops 
beneath it and eventually, after a short or a lengthy 
struggle, replaces it. 
This perennial opposition between life and form -
Simmel believes for reasons which he does not analyze - is 
intesified and enhanced in our age. For Simmel the cult of 
life has deeply influenced the philosophical outlook of our 
age. He sees every period in history as producing one 
specific idea which dominates that era as its secret 
king . In classical Greece this central concept was the idea 
of Being; in the middle ages, the Idea of God; in 
Renaissance, the idea of Nature; and in the seventeenth 
century, the idea of Natural law. During the eighteenth 
century the Individual becomes the central theme; and in the 
twentieth century the concept of Life excels all others in 
its appeal to us and its influence upon our outlook. 
To show that the conflict between Form and Life has 
reached even the most personal and intimate aspects of human 
relations, Simmel describes the development of attitudes 
towards sex under the impact of modern civilization. There 
are many such reflections of contemporary man's fear that 
his individuality will be destroyed, that he is living under 
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conditions which compel him to become estranged from his 
own self. There are numerous indications that this 
apprehension is one of the decisive forces in the thinking 
of modern man and that accounts for the strong appeal of 
existential philosophy. Individual should become that which 
he is, even if this commitment to his own self, to his 
"authentic existence", means that he had to accept the fate 
of the lonely "outsider" . 
Existential philosophy is essentially a revolt 
against the belief deeply rooted in the development of 
modern thought, that truth can be ascertained only through 
detachment, that the cognitive act requires a radical 
seperation between the knower, represented as the subject, 
and the reality to be known, represented as the object. 
Already in the nineteenth century there could be heard the 
voices of a few lonely thinkers who recognized the danger 
lying in the split between subject and object. Kierkegaard 
expressed his disdain for the merely "cognitive subject", 
whom he confronted with the existential thinker. He argued 
that "knowledge has a relationship to the knower, who is 
essentially an existing individual, and that for this reason 
all essential knowledge is essentially related to 
existence". A thinker as different from Kierkegaard as 
Feuerbach insisted : "Do not wish to be a philosopher in 
contrast to being a man do not think as a 
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thinker think as a living, real being think 
in Existence . 
Among the first to concern themselves with 
self-alienation as a general condition were Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche in their respectively despairing and angry tracts 
about the nothingness or selflessness that yawned before men 
in a technological, secular, and materialistic society. Thus 
Kierkegaard who felt that the self could only be preserved 
by identification with God, spoke of godless man's essential 
dread at being dominated by an alien power wich threatens 
our dissolution - by which he meant anxiety that loss of 
self can produce. Despair about loss of self he called a 
"sickness unto Death". Nietzsche however, proclaimed the 
death of the gods but asked, "Do we not now wander through 
an endless nothingness?" More recently Karl Jaspers has 
written : "what, in all the millenniums of human history and 
pre-history, no god has been able to do for man, man has 
done for himself. It is natural enough that in these 
achievements of his he should discern the true inwardness of 
being - until he shrinks back in alarm from the void he has 
made for himself". The problem which Jaspers raises is 
whether man can preserve his selfhood or identity in a world 
dominated by a grand technological and bureaucratic 
"apparatus" of his own creation, yet alien to him. The price 
we pay for "progress", he suggests, is anxiety, "a dread of 
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life perhaps unparalleled in its intensity" and increasing 
"to such a pitch that the sufferer may feel himself to be 
nothing more than a lost point in empty space, in as much as 
all human relationships appear to have no more than a 
Q 
temporary validity" . 
Husserl differentiated, between existentia and 
essentia and it became a gripping message for an age that 
had grown av/are of the separation between subject and 
object. Husserl is concerned with essences and our 
knowledge of them. It is true, Husserl says, that we c not 
reach them by means of sensory perception. But he suggests 
that we liberate ourselves from the positivistic prejudice 
which recognizes only those experiences as valid that have 
been acquired by sensory perception. If we overcome this 
narrowness Husserl says, we shall realize that essences can 
be made experienceable, that they can be grasped and "seen" 
intuitively. This envisagement of essences has nothing to do 
with a sudden revelation and is not an easy task. It can be 
acheieved by along and often difficult preparation, which 
Husserl calls phenomenological reduction. The objective of 
phenomenological reduction is to suspend all consideration 
of the existing world to put the factual into brackets. This 
can be achieved, Husserl believes, because man's mind has 
the power to differentiate between existentia and essentia, 
to set aside existences, and to attain pure consciousness 
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of essences. 
It was hoped that in the intuitive grasping of 
essences a way had been found to bridge the gulf between 
subject and object, but soon it was felt unsatisfactory as 
Hesserls program did not help to bridge the chasm between 
man's mind and the outside world. Existential philosphers 
opposed Husserl's seperation of essence and existences, his 
claim that we can grasp the essence of objects regardless of 
whether they actually exist. They emphasized that the 
concept of essence is a static one and can be applied only 
to those forms of reality which are characterized by a fixed 
and unchangeable nature. All attempts to describe man by 
explaining his essence will result in reducing him to a 
thing, as evidenced by Descarte's definition of man as res-
cogitus, a thing that thinks. Such an approach overlooks the 
fact that man differs from an object in that he is not 
predetermined by properties but creates himself through his 
own choices and acts. Far from being a product of his 
qualities, he is what he spontaneously decides to be. 
Though the leading exponents of existential 
philosophy differ in many of their ideas, they all stress 
the view that human self does not coincide with the 
individual's basic properties. Human being is capable of 
breaking away from and transcending its own properties, and 
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even external conditions of its environment. In his essay 
"La Republique du Silence", Sartre has written a few 
sentences which not only describe the attitude of his 
countrymen during the Nazi occupation of France but convey 
at the same time the indeterministic orientation of 
existentialist thought : 
We were never more free than during the Germaa 
occupation. We had lost all our rights, 
beginning with the right to talk. Everyday we 
were insulted to our faces and had to take it 
in silence. Under one pretext or another, as 
workers, Jews . or Political prisoners, we 
were deported EN MASSE. Every where, on 
billboards, in the newspapaers, on the screen, 
we encounter the revolting and insipid picture 
of ourselves that our oppressors wanted us to 
accept. And, because all of this, we were 
free. Because the Nazi venom speed even into 
our thoughts, every accurate thought was a 
conquest. Because an all-powerful police tried 
to force us to hold our tongues, every word 
look on the value of a declaration of 
principles. Because we were hunted down, every 
one of our gestures had the weights of a 
solemn commitment And the choice that 
each of us made of his size and of his being 
was an authentic choice because it was made 
face to face with death, because it could 
always have been expressed in these terms : 
"Rather death than " And here I am not 
speaking of the elite among us who were real 
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Resistants, but of all Frenchmen who , at 
every hour of the night and day throughout 
four years, answered no Thus the basic 
questions of liberty itself was posed, and we 
were brought to the verge of the deepest 
knowledge that man can have a himself. For the 
secret of a man is not his inferiority 
complex : it is the limit of his own liberty, 
his capacity for resisting torture and 
death . 
Ortega Y Gasset, has stated that the static meaning of 
the term "to be" makes it entirely inadequate to describe 
man's existence. We cannot say, he insists, that man "is" 
but only that he is on the way to be this or that . This 
formulation expresses well the meaning of the 
existentialists view that the core of man's existence is 
possibility. For them existence is being which in every 
movement transcends itself, which since it is directed 
toward the future, is constantly in advance of itself. Thus 
they consider man's existence as his concern to become what 
he is and to be what he has to become. Heideggar and also 
the French existentialists proclaim the paradox that man, in 
order to exist, has to throw himself toward his own being. 
Therefore they call his existence a project and that project 
has nothing to do with a conscious or rationally designed 
plan : instead it indicates that man's existence has to move 
beyond itself in order to move towards itself. 
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And if existence is nothing but possibility, man's 
destiny is a hard one. At every moment he faces various 
alternatives between which he has to choose. This 
constitutes his freedom, but it thrusts upon him a 
frightening burden of responsibility. He is forced into 
cruel situations, in which a decision for any of the various 
possibilities will reveal the close relationship between 
freedom and quiet. Thus man does not cherish his 
sovereignty, which not only enables but compels him to make 
his own choices. He feels himself condemned to be free 
(Sartre). He tries to avoid a state of being in which he 
must ceaselessly decide for himself. But when man seeks to 
evade the decisions with which he is faced, he is really 
attempting to escape fromhis own self. He tries to escape 
what he cannot escape what he is . Yet so deep is 
his anguish that he feels himself driven to slip away into a 
world in which he is not any longer committed to his own 
self but can follow the choices of "the others", of that 
anonymous collective which is called "they". This is a 
totally depersonalized way of being, so general and 
inarticulate that Heidegger characterizes it by using the 
German pronoun man i.e fallen state of mans -a most 
impersonal and neutral term, meaning "one of many" or 
day-to-day being. It is well fitted to reveal the innermost 
nature of a world where every-one is "the other one" and 
nobody is his own self, and where the meaning of the 
44 
personal pronoun has been lost to such an extent that 
statements like "I think", "I prefer", "I act" have become 
empty forms 
Heidegger believes that if man tends to flee from 
himself and to plunge from the height of solitude into the 
public lowlands of the many we should not see in this fall a 
descent into inquietude and crisis. Quite the contrary : "to 
exist simply as one of the many" exercises a profoundly 
appeasing influence as if everything was in the best 
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order . Tempting as this appeasment is, man cannot obtain 
it without paying a high price. He must cease to be himself, 
he must become estranged from his own self, that is 
authentic self. 
Heidegger and most of the existential philosophers 
offer us a more gloomy picture of human existence. Man is 
alienated from reality, as the result of a split between 
subject and object which detached knowledge does not heal 
but deepens. He is estranged from himself, because in flight 
from himself he lets his existence be plunged down into the 
inauthenticity of the anonymous crowd. The alienated person 
is out of touch with himself as he is out of touch with any 
other person. 
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History offers plentiful evidence that men in times 
past also felt no small uncertainty about themselves and 
their identities, suffered no little anguish of gloom, 
despair and feelings of detachment from each other. Karl 
Jaspers quotes an Egyptian chronicler of four thousand years 
age: "Robbers abound No one ploughs the land. 
People are saying: "we do not know what will happen from day 
to day Dirt prevails everywhere, and no longer 
does any one wear clean raiment The country is 
spining round and round like a potter's wheel slave -
women are wearing necklaces of gold and lapis lazuli 
No more do we hear any one laugh Great men and 
small agree in saying : 'would that I had never been 
born' No public office stands open where it should, 
and the, masses are like timid sheep without a shephered... 
Artists have ceased to play their art the few stay 
the many one who yesterday was indigent is 
now wealthy, and the sometime rich over-whelm him with 
adulation Impudence is rife Oh that man 
could cease to be, that women should no longer conceive and 
give birth. Then, at length, the world would find 
..14 peace" 
We see a similar moral collapse in Greece during 
the peloponnesian war. As for medieval Europe, Huizinga 
reminds us that the middle ages were essentially violent in 
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character: wars, class - struggles, hysterical crowd 
behaviour, vice and crime, plagues, scarcity, superstition, 
the conviction that the world was coming to n^ end - such 
was the "black" background of medieval life. A late -nedieval-
fifteenth century French poet, Eustache Deschamps, cried: 
Why are times so dark 
Men know each other not at all. 
But governments quite clearly change 
From bad to worse? 
Days dead and gone were more worth while 
Now that holds sway? Deep gloom and Boredom, 
Justice and law nowhere to be found 
I know no more where I belong. 
I know no more where I belong. Is this not the 
alienated lament of all ages. 
Lewis Mumford writes, "The unattached person during 
the middle Ages was one either condemned to exile or doomed 
to death: if alive, he immediately sought to attach himself, 
at least to a band of robbers. To exist, one had to belong 
to an association: a house-hold, a manor, a monastery, a 
guild; there was no security except in association, and no 
freedom that did not recognize the obligations of a 
corporate life. One lived and died in the style of one's 
class and corporation". Moreover, as Herbert Muller notes. 
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"Men had known a kind of psychological security; they took 
for granted all the actual insecurity of life in a vale of 
tears 
It is the historical emergence of individual as we 
know him, of man alone, that makes alienation so crucially a 
modern problem. In the past, men felt anxiety of despair 
particularly when they lost the status that identified then 
and offered them some security. But when the medieval system 
collapsed, the likelihood of alienation increased 
appreciably. Indeed, only with the release of the 
individual from medieval bonds could alienation become a 
widespread social problem. "The breakdown of the feudal 
order forced man to fall back upon himself; he had to learn 
how to cope with countless problems and decisions that were 
once taken care of by worldly and spiritual hierarchies. 
But together with the anxieties generated by this new 
autonomy he sensed a great promise, for in the period of the 
formation of the national state and the development of a 
mercantile economy his own future seemed to have infinite 
possibilities. At the end of the curve, in our own century, 
he begins to feel threatened by the encroachment of powerful 
social forces emanating not only from his own corner of the 
earth but from every part of a contracting world" 
4 8 
Historically one of the first major results of 
mechanization was to transform labour; what had formerly 
been an integral part of human life became a means to an 
end. To feed and operate the machines of the new 
civilization required not just raw materials but "free" 
labour. Since industrialism was pioneered by capitalists 
this meant a special kind of freedom. And for a man to be 
treated as commodity a brutal operation was required; the 
"freeing" of labour from traditional bonds of craft, family 
and community. Thus one of the many tragic ironies of the 
early capitalist market economy was that men expected it to 
automatically lead to general welfare. By a complex 
interplay of economic and technological imperatives the 
community was slowly and steadily sundered into mutually 
exclusive segments of action or spheres of opera-
tion . 
When labour became a mechanically regulated 
commodity, man lost a part of himself. This turns us to the 
major theme of Alienation; for as Karl Marx saw it, the 
worker; having lost control over both the conditions of his 
labour and the fruit of his labour, became alienated from 
17 himself. Marx described the existence of contemporary man 
as largely shaped by the rise and dominant influence of 
commodity exchange. He considered the commodity to be the 
most elementary form of modern wealth and gave it a central 
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position in his analysis of the economic and social features 
of capitalism. Once commodity production has become the 
universal mode, all of man's economic activities and 
processes will centre around it. Its main feature, exchange 
value, will reach out beyond the merely economic realm and 
18 penetrate the whole of human existence . Marx also asserts: 
"we are excluded from true property because our property 
19 
excludes the other man" . The Idea of Alienation, however, 
Marx had borrowed from Hegel, who 'conceived' it chiefly in 
metaphysical terms and who described it as a general human 
condition. Hegel wrote of "Spirit" as "at war with itself"; 
in consequence, it "has to overcome itself as its (own) most 
formidable obstacle. That development which in the sphere of 
Nature is a peaceful growth, is (for the) spirit, a severe, 
a might conflict with itself. What spirit really strives for 
is the realization of its Ideal being; but in doing so, it 
hides that goal from its own vision, and is proud and 
well-satisfied in this alienation" . For Hegel, therefore, 
man's own intellectual creations become independent of their 
creator and hence alien to him. Human achievement is a 
dialectical process in which man can advance to higher forms 
only by mastering himself and the cultural forces that he 
creates. Therefore, the history of man is a history of his 
alienation or frustration. 
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While Hegel saw alienation as a metaphysical 
problem, Marx gave it a sociological frame of reference. In 
his essay of 1844 he wrote that under the system of private 
property the worker was alienated from the product of his 
labour and also from the means of production - both of which 
had become things "not belonging to him". The worker thus 
separated from his product is alienated from himself, since 
his labour is no longer his own but the proeprty of another. 
Finally he is alienated from other men, since his chief link 
with them now is the commodities they exchange or produce. 
This process alienates worker from nature. This results in 
self-estrangement, estrangement with his product and 
society. In order to find himself he has to destroy the 
capitalist society. 
The industrial revoluti on and its subsequent 
transformation of human labour into a commodity are among 
the major alienating forces in the capitalist world. To 
administer their complex technology and labour markets men 
developed elaborate social structures or bureaucracies 
which were no less impersonal in their effects than 
machines. Indeed, that was their aim; and they attempted 
further to "rationalize" the conduct of human affairs by 
subjecting it to rules, regulations and a hierarchy as 
described by Maxweber. Thus modern age has enomrausly tried to 
grope alien forces over men. Marx's analysis of the new 
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conditions of labour under capitalism was complemented half 
a century later by Weber's studies of bureaucracy, Weber 
thought that bureauracy became particularly appropriate for 
capitalism because "the more bureaucracy 'depersonalizes' 
itself, the more completely it succeeds in achieving the 
exclusion of love, hatred, and every purely personal, 
especially irrational and incalculable feeling from the 
execution of official tasks. In the place of the old-type 
ruler who is moved by sympathy, favour, grace and gratitude, 
modern culture requires for its sustaining external 
apparatus the emotionally detached, and hence rigorously 
'professional' expert"'^  
How industrial and bureaucratic machines alienate 
men can be seen clearly in modern conditions of work. 
Increasing division of labour, greater mechanization, the 
growth of giant industrial and financial enterprises - these 
are the agents of our economic power and also of individual 
powerlessness. 
In a recent survey of industrial worker's attitudes 
Robert Dubin shows that for most of them work is not a 
central life interest. Dubin says, "Not only is the 
workplace relatively unimportant as a place of preferred 
primary human relationship, but it cannot even evoke 
significant sentiments and emotions in its occupants". Most 
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workers are not happy in their jobs, that they feel trapped 
and degraded by their working conditions, that they have 
powerful desire to escape from the factory, their works and 
that what drives them on is the incessant demands of oup 
consumption economy. In view of the same far from escaping, 
growing numbers of industrial workers and their families are 
forced to take on additional jobs in order to keep up with 
the rising cost of living. 
Consequently there has been a serious fall in 
morale. It is a measure of the boring conditions of work. 7^ 
cruel work situation is bound to evoke anger or i^ g^e, 
however, repressed. But even under "Ideal" conditions of 
bureaucratic order - where there are neither great creative 
incentives nor disruptive tensions - the result is an 
isolated, remote world of conformists, that is what Mills 
calls the "cheerful robberts". 
The alienating influences of industrialism extend 
far beyond the individual worker; they alienate his family 
and his community with equal intensity and force. As the old 
crafts declined, and labour became increasingly divided and 
specialized, the economic and social base of the large 
family was destroyed. Lost were customs and skills that had 
been passed on from one generation to another. Gone were the 
close bonds between young and old, and especially the 
respect that youth had previously given to age. Into the new 
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industrial cities poured millions who had cut off from 
their traditional family roots. 
With changes in family function, especially the 
decline of large kinship group as an operating unit, have 
come significant changes in structure. Work is now 
increasingly separated from family life and Parents 
disappear during the day, leaving children to grow up 
chiefly with servants or in boardings. They have no time 
to spend with their children. Most affected by the 
breakdo'vTi of the extended family, however are the aged. 
Overwhelming majority of citizens oppose the idea of 
having older persons live with their children. As these 
trends continue - the prolongation of life, early 
retirement, breakdown of the extended family - the aged 
become outcasts in a society like ours that places such 
emphasis on youth and energies. The elderly citizens are 
being increasingly shifted to separate housing colonies 
where they nurse their painful lives by recourse to 
nostalgic rememberences of their youth. In their twilight 
world there is only fleeting contact with the community. 
The rise of 'nuclear family' (the small core unit of 
parents and kids) is directly and intimately linked to 
these distinguishing or characterizing features of our 
Industrial Age, inspired and brought about by 
ever-increasing technological sophistication. 
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In the beginning we said that men today are 
estranged from others as well as from themselves. But 
"others" means not only the social communities in which 
they live; it also refers to the natural and supernatural 
worlds beyond. When we speak of man's alienation from 
nature, we do not mean nature in metaphysical sense -
although fairly serious metaphysical problems are 
involved; all we mean is that men and women today are not 
as close to land, air, water wind and mountains as their 
ancestors were. That is how I express this feeling : 
The night kept descending 
I stared at the falling stars, 
the silver streams 
flowed down the mountains 
fading in darkness, 
the constellation of stars 
adorned the world and dissolved, 
and the moon bowed down 
to kiss the cold forehead 
the horizon darkened even deeper, 
I kept lying for long 
without a breath, a notion, 
and memory kept enveloping my being 
with the dead leaves of fallen flowers.^1 
Isolation from nature is not just a matter of 
living in cities even more importantly it involves a 
momentous change in man's outlook on the world. Men do 
not simply coexist with nature, they search for meaning in 
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it. For this they depend on myth and religion. All 
religious beliefs known to man help create and sustain 
bonds between him and the external world of other men and 
of nature. But if faith weakens or is destroyed in the 
onslought of science and secularisation, man is truly 
alone. As Joseph Cambell writes, "The problem of mankind 
today is the opposite to that of men in the 
comparatively stable period of those great co-ordinating 
mythologies which now are known as lies. Then all meaning 
was in the group, in the great anonymous forms, none in 
the self-expressive individual; today no meaning is in 
the group - none in the world : all is in the individual. 
But one does not know toward that one moves. One does 
not know by what one is propelled... Not the animal world, 
not the plant world, but man himself is now the crucial 
mystery. Man is that alien presence with whom the forces 
of egoism must come to terms, through whom the ego is to 
be crucified and resurrected and in whose image society is 
22 to be reformed. 
So we have a view of man divorced from nature, 
bereft of his religion, isolted in his community and 
chained to monotonous work. It is approprite at this point 
to consider our Mass Society, its culture, and its 
politics. The mass society resulted from the rapid 
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increase in the size of the electorate. Extension of 
suffrage to the working class who had fought for it, led 
in turn to the rise of mass political parties and also to 
new techniques of communication : mass circulation 
newspapers, films, radio and television etc. 
The results of these developments are well known. 
In politics, the number of people involved tend to engulf 
the individual, whether he dissents from majority opinion 
and taste, or whether he merely conforms helplessly with 
the overwhelming majority. 
What is alienating in mass society is not merely 
the corruption of art, or the power of the multitudes - a 
power often exaggerated but more importantly, the 
atomization of individuals who make up the mass. Mass 
society weakens or destroys traditional human groupings, 
thus leaving the individual at the mercy of impersonal 
"communication", such as newspaper and radio. In addition 
this process of communciation itself, presumably a two-way 
system, tends to beco.Tie a one-way street, with individuals 
more on the receiving or taking end than on the giving 
end. How does one talk back to a TV screen ? As a result, 
the formation of opinion is facilitated for those who 
control the channels of communication. Whether they be 
propagandists or the advertising industry in our own 
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society; the stage is set for manipulation of tastes and 
opinions as obstacles to mass persuasion are removed. A 
polluted mass is alienated to the extent that it is 
powerless to withstand these pressures. So it is not 
masses but a powerful elite which monopolizes the means of 
communication, thereby weakening primary human relations 
23 
and creating obedient multitudes. 
Another major form of alienation reflected at one 
extreme is the revolts of artists and intellectuals against 
what they consider the uncongenial and materialistic 
standards of bourgeois society. Personifying this revolt 
in their art, as well as in their lives, are writers like 
Baudetaire - an "internal emigrant" who longed to escape 
"any where out of this world"; Rimband who did escape and 
whose self-imposed exile became a model for many artistic 
rebels following him; Dostovesky - who regarded the 
freedom of the atheistic individual, his loneliness and 
isolation as the greatest of evils and in whose works the 
twin themes of the atomization of society and 
self-alienation recieve their supreme expression. We are 
dealing with more than mere disenchantment. Thus says 
Charles Peguy : "The modern world debases. It debases the 
state; it debases man. It debases love; it debases woman, 
it debases the race; it debases the child. It debases the 
nation; it debases the family. It even....has succeeded in 
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debasing what is perhaps most difficult in the world to 
debase - because that is something which has in itself, as 
in its texture, a particular kind of dignity, like a 
24 
singular incapacity for degradation - it debases death." 
Man's alienation has been described with methodic 
and terrifying precision by Kafka, who wrote of himself; 
"I am separated from all things by a hallow space, and I 
25 do not even reach to its boundaries". The mam 
characters in his Novels, The Trail and The Castle are 
completely depersonalized and reduced to mere masks. This 
loss of identity leads to a state of radical anonymity, 
which the author symbolizes by not using a name but merely 
a letter of the alphabet to refer to them. 
American novelists also have described man's fate 
in terms of alienation and homelessness. Thomas Wholfe, who 
devotes much of his work to recording the painful 
experience of the uprooted man, the nostalgic exile and 
wanderer, sums it up in the symbolic words of Engene 
Gant, the central figure of "The Return of the Prodigal"; 
"What did you came home for ?... you know now that you 
can't go home again". 
Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman portrayes 
lives of many individuals. It shows Willy Loman - the 
"other - directed man" personified - striving all his life 
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to be popular and "liked" but remaining absolutely lonesome 
and irrelevent, forever dreaming that "personality always 
wins the day" but in reality destined, as his wife fears, 
"to fall into his grave like an old dog" Hist motto is : 
start big and you will end big. He advises his son : "Get 
right down the field under the ball, and when you hit, hit 
low and hit hard". He does not realize that he himself is 
kicked around and that his whole existence is summed up in 
the word with which one of the women in the play describes 
her life "a foot ball".^ "^  
The alienation is not an unknown phenomenon to the 
Asian psychy also, especially to famous Urdu poet Ghalib 
who's first peotic collection published during the Indian 
mutiny bears a famous persian couplet : 
BEAWARED GAR EINJA BUWAD SUKHAN DANE 
GHAREEBE SHAHR SUKHAN HAE GUFTANI DARAD 
''^— '-J ir^'y. ^ q^ />>^ t 
> 
There is a person who is in search of a close 
friend to whom he can disclose all the insights of his 
heart. The same echo we can find in the famous disciple of 
Ghalib, Altaf Hussain who has said in his couplet that he 
is in search of a person who can understand his language 
and emotion : 
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KOYEE MEHRAM NAHIN MILTA JAHAN MEN 
MUJHE KEHNA HAI KUCH APNI ZUBAN MEN 
Even Iqbal has explored the helplessness of human self : 
TERAY AZAD BANDON KI NA YE DUNIYA NA WO DUNIYA 
YAHAN MARNAY KI PABANDI WAHAN JEENAY KI PABANDI 
m 
Alienation expressed by Artists is the most 
sensational. The writers whom we quoted, reflect a growing 
contemporary concern about man's Isolation and Alienation 
but this does not mean that they visualize this 
estrangement in the same way as the existentialists do. 
Unlike those followers of Heidegger and Sartre who look 
man's alienation and homelessness as his eternal fate, many 
of those v\?ho turn to the writers we have mentioned 
attribute the alienation to historical events. 
Such an explanation, no doubt right in emphasizing 
the historical aspects of man's alienation, attributes the 
rise of alienation to a few isolated and almost fortuitous 
occurrences which have broken in upon the lives of the 
present generation - so to speak - from the outside. 
However, such a premise is of dubious merit because it 
tends unduly to limit the scope of inquiry. It leads us to 
61 
ignore that alienation is manifest in all realms of modern 
life, that its existence is not just the result of 
certain accidents of recent history but exemplifies one of 
the basic trends of our age. To conclude I would like to 
mention one of my poems : 
My bed is a wilderness 
of sleeplessness, 
I break into pieces 
licking dust, 
I wear a white layer 
of Plaster of Paris 
every night 
on my being, 
and when the morning arrives.... 
I find a line drawn 
on my bed, 
and the continuity of that line 
remains intact 
even when divided 
into a thousand bits. 
CHAPTER I I I 
CAMUS' CONCEPT OF STRANGER 
"We are made to live for others. But one really dies 
for oneself." The author of this journal entry was 46 and 
world famous when he was killed in a car clash south of 
Paris on June 4, 1960. Camu's posthumous existence has been 
odd. During the last ten years of his life, he was not 
merely admired as a great writer and a Nobel prize-winner 
but also worshiped like a film star; in reality however, it 
is said, he was a lonely and dispirited man. As a journalist 
he worked for the left wing Alqer-Republician in the 30's 
and for the Resistence Magazine and newspaper Combat in the 
40's. As an actor and a director he founded the experimental 
Theatre du Travail, in Algeria and later adapted and 
directed several plays for the Parais stjge. As reader for 
Gallimard he associated with the intellectuals of the day 
and encouraged new writers. As a creative writer he grappled 
with the problems of human condition and became the 
moral conscience of his age. In his private unknown 
side Tuberculosis dominated his existence and hightened 
his awareness of death and his will to live. His 
disastrous first marriage to the young morphine adddict 
Simone Hie affected him emotionally and psychologi-
cally while his blatent infidelities after his second 
marriage to Francine Faure only increased his 
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feelings of guilt - a notorious womanizer, his private life 
did not match his public images as a lay saint. 
At the time of death, Camus was working on a long 
autobiographical Novel Le Premier Homme (The first man) . 
Near the scene of the fatal accident investigators found 
Camus' mud-stained, briefcase; among its contents were 144 
hand written manuscript pages containing about 80,000 words 
- a first version of the part of his intended work . Camus's 
widow Franine refused all entreaties to publish it, 
but his daughter Cathrine, now 48, who inhereted her 
fathers estate after her mothers death in 1979, decided 
that the manuscript would be made public. So thirty four 
years after his death Camus has a best seller - The first 
man. 
Just published in April 1994 - The book has already 
run through seven printings - 50,000 copies were sold only 
2 
m first week, in France . So Camus once again caused an 
immense sensation in the literary world. "His feverish voice 
is through out", writes Critic Francoise Girnod, a voice 
3 that/ at times, pierces your heart". In the news magazine 
Le Point, Jacques - Pierre Amette declares that "The voice 
of Camus, more resonant than ever in its trembling, 
4 
solemnity addresses itself, to todays generation" . Today 
Camus' standing has steadily improved. His first novel. The 
Stranger is required reading in French schools and sells 
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200,000 copies a year , Le Premier Homme added a new 
dimension to the legend of Camus. "For the first time", 
says Camus' biographer Rager Grenier, "Lets his feelings 
speak". It can be a rare glimpse into the life of an 
intensely private man. That is what Sharad Chandra 
expresses, "Albert Camus" newly published novel has an 
unmistakable personal poignancy absent in the works 
published in his life time". 
Besides being an eminent writer, Camus contributed 
in a significant way to existentialist philosophy. The 
20th century with two great world wars witnessed the 
barbarity and inhuman nature of human beings which was the 
result of dehumanization under gigantic development of 
industry ?ud technology. Dehuminization is synominious with 
man's alienation from himself. Camus is particularly 
concerned with this issue. What Camus wishes to affirm 
against the dehumanization is a renewed sense of the 
human, which proves his message to be very much in the main 
stream of existentialist thought. 
So as an existentialist Camus is also concerned 
with the problem of Alienati on. The only difference between 
him and other existentialists is that Camus considers life 
as Absurd, and therefore, in his view man is lost in 
Absurdity. Whatever can^give meaning to an individual life 
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is to overcome life's absurdity. In his first novel The 
Outsider (L' Etranger) he confines himself to Absurdity of 
life. Not only this, he emphasizes the meaninglessness of 
life as well as death in his other writings with great 
existential pathos and artistic dexterity. Some other 
existentialists also hold the view that life is 
meaningless. For instance, Sartre argues that man's 
existence is grounded in nothingness. It means that he is 
free to give meaning to his life and environment in 
whatever way he decides. Sartre holds that though the 
universe is meaningless, yet human existence is not. He 
says that meaning enters into the world with Being-for-
itself i.e. Human existence. Camus in his earlier phase 
does not agree with this view. His philosophy begins with 
absurdity of life and ends with absurdity of death. Sartre 
and other existentialists hold that death completes the 
meaning of life. This is the point of departure in Camus' 
concept of absurdity. This indicates his concept of 
alienation. Heidegger considers man lost in the society and 
deprived of his freedom as absurd entity. Exercising one's 
freedom and overcoming the world is the way to make life 
meaningful. Jaspers is of the view that the entire 
contemporary world predetermined and dominated by 
technocracy and bureaucracy reduces individual human 
existence to meaningless being. In order to make it 
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meaningful man has to transcend this world and also his own 
existence. In Camu's The Outsider there is no suggestion 
how Absurdity can be overcome and life be made meaningful. 
But in his other writtings we find an existential struggle 
to overcome absurdity of life. In his philosophical works, 
like Rebel, and Myth of Sysiphus, this attempt is obvious. 
Similarly in his writtings on political issues and the 
historical situations, particularly under the occucpation 
of France by Nazi Germany, there is evidence of finding 
meaning of life and individual existence. In his last 
novel. The first man, we find a Camus different from the 
one who emphasizes absurdity of life in his early works. 
Camus's concept of absurdity of life leads him to 
his concept of an outsider. Actually his outsider is an 
individual who is alienated from his society and his 
ownself. It is therefore essential to fully understand and 
analyse how he explains his concept of alienation and its 
causes in present society. With some effort, it may be also 
found in his writtings that alienation is caused by the 
absurdity of life. Had he been concerned only with 
propogating absurdity of life, he would not have actively 
participated in political movements in France and Algeria. 
Absurdity of life of both these countries during his 
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political struggle was caused by lack of freedom of human 
beings. He struggles throughout his life to give back this 
freedom to man. These ideas may not be easily discovered in 
his first novel The Outsider. It is therefore essential to 
understasnd his concept of alienated man (out-sider) with 
the help of his other writtings which include Journalistic 
writtings, political and social essays, plays, short 
stories and other novels. 
The outsider is perhaps the most notable modern 
attempt to describe a man unrelated to anything or any one 
at all, a man for whom everything is meaningless, a man who 
mtirders and feels nothing, a man who ends his tale of 
"nothingness" and absurdity by saying "for all to be 
accomplished, for me to feel less lonely, all that remained 
to hope was that on the day of my execution there should be 
a huge crowd of spectators and that they should greet me 
7 
with howls of execration". His indifference at the news of 
his mothers death and at" . her funeral also indicate his 
attitude towards life and death, both of which seem to be 
absurd to him. Camus from the begining regarded certain 
responses to absurdity as morally unacceptable. In his 
letters to a German Friend (1943-44) he intepreted Nazism 
as one reaction to the very nihilistic vision of the world 
o 
that he himself had come to accept. He then went to 
condemn it in the severest terms for its denial of human 
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fraternity. Even at this stage in the development of his 
thought Camus insisted that an authentic revolt against the 
human condition had to be a revolt in the name of the 
solidarity of man with man. 
In the character of Meursault, the "hero" of The 
Stranger, this tension between Camus's nihilistic vision 
and his ethical demands becomes particularly clear. 
Meursault is presented as a man characterized by the moral 
equivalent of achromtic vision:. Although he is not at all 
given to Philosophical reflection, he views the whole 
conventional human apparatus of moral distinction, of 
justice and of guilt, as a kind of senseless, complicated 
9 
formal procedure with no basis in reality. He stands, in 
fact, outside the whole moral world in a peculiar state that 
Camus describes as "innocence", apparently because in a 
world that affords no transcendental sanction for human 
judgements of right and wrong there can be no real guilt. 
His relationship to his mother and to his mistress are 
devoid of feeling, and he eventually kills an Arab for no 
particular reason. But at the very end of the novel, after 
Meursault, facing execution, has burst into a rage against 
a priest who tries to persuade him to accept the reality of 
his guilt and the possibility of redemption. There is a 
long semipoetic passage in which he declares his love of 
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the world and its sensuous immediacy and speaks tenderly 
and almost lovingly of his fellow men and of their common 
fate, which he shares. Camus wishes to persuade us that 
these two aspects of Meursault's character are not just 
consistent but intimately related to one another; but again 
he experienced difficulty in showing how a positive ethic 
of human fraternity can be generated by a nihilistic 
attitude towards all values. 
The Stranger cannot be well understood if we begin 
with the concept of absurdity because Camus had a different 
starting-point. He wanted to probe the experience of 
oneness which he had discovered in his mother's 
indifference and on the Algerian beaches. The Stranger has 
a lyrical impetus with a central image of sun bathing. 
Camus reveals the primitive quality that his friends 
admired because he wants to seize that oneness directly and 
will tolerate no intellectual subterfuges. Moreover this 
is religious writing because Camus wants to depict a state 
of innocence or goodness where man is freed from the 
divisions of his fallen, sinful state and where he is 
reconciled with himself. 
Yet Camus cannot believe in this reconciliation 
because the stark fact of human mortality is emphasized by 
the bare Algerian mountains. The awareness of death remains 
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in man's consciousness as an otherness. This is the 
experience of the absurd, which must be understood as a 
failure to attain the oneness that was Camus' prime 
concern. He depicts absurd man who is actually aware of his 
contradictions : the Meursault keeps asking questions about 
the world around him, although he can discover no answers. 
Death is Seductive : 'I understand that men 
sometimes wish to die because, when life is revealed in all 
its transparency, nothing is important any longer. 
Transparency means the way in which the concrete world 
dissolves into near-emptiness. This tempts man and fills 
him with a death-wish which may take the form of suicide. 
Such a death-wish haunted Camus, but it disgusted as well 
as tempted him. When he describes his stay in Prague he 
depicts the disintegration of human character. Habit 
protects man, as do friends and most interestingly, words. 
But travel breaks down such things and compels man to face 
his emptiness. He is not a journalist or an office-worker 
or whatever he thought he was. The various traits of his 
character such as bravery, generosity or kindness crumble 
and leave him without any personality. This frightens him 
and he may plunge into violence or madness in order to 
escape from the anguish which is the mark of his condition. 
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Conversly man may live most intensely in such moments because 
he participates in the beauty of the universe. When Camus 
emerges from bathing and greetes his friends : he was 
saturated with delight and bleached by the sun. 
Disintegration of self may be a liberation from the tedious 
ties of everyday life. At these moments the primitive of 
Camus exulted in the beauty he felt around him. 
Meursault trusts only his own experience and 
dismisses philosophy and tradition. He is watchful, observent 
of the details of human life and cosmic situation, in all 
their manifestations and details. However he doesn't find any 
ultimate standard of justification of his personal actions as 
well as the social responses thereof. There are no 
ideological or philosophical norms by reference to which he 
could pronounce moral judgements and examine his personal 
behaviour as well as the social reactions therearound. It 
seems to him that all actions as well as situations are 
de-trope; and no ethical or philosophical criteria can be 
deemed to be ultimate and absolute, in view of the fact that 
all standards in order to be justifiable need other standards 
of evaluation and so an add infintum. We can nowhere stop and 
accept any set of given standards as beyond the ken of 
criticism. Therefore human life as well as cosmic situation 
seem to be normless and Meursault finds himself in a 
meaningless and absurd life-situation. 
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Meursault is deemed to be violating the social 
standards or questioning the basic norms of social existence 
by not crying at his mothers funeral and therefore his 
behaviour is pronounced to be unethical and unacceptable. 
Camus wants to point out that any socially deviant behaviour 
is deemed a ground enough to judge a man to be a violator of 
given set of norms and therefore in the eyes of the 
flag-bearers of so called social standards; he can 
justifiably be considered to be an outsider and condemned to 
death. 
Meursault is a person who accepts life as it is and 
accepts himself as he is. He does not want to polish up the 
sordid features of human existence or cover up his own 
limitations by resorting to mulLiple possible interpreta-
tions or justifications. Camus himself gives a concise 
summary of the character of Meursault as "....to get a more 
accurate picture of his character, or rather one which 
confirms more closely to his author's intentions, you must 
ask yourself in what way Meursault does not play the game. 
The answer is simple : he refuses to lie. Lying is not only 
saying what is not true. It is also, in fact especially, 
saying more than v*iat is true and, in the case of the human heart, 
saying more than one feels. We all do it, everyday, to make 
life simpler. But, contrary to appearances^ Meaursault does 
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not want to make life simpler. He says what he is, he 
refuses to hide his feelings and society immediatly feels 
threatened, e.g., he is asked to say that he regrets his 
crime, in time-honoured fashion. He replies that he feels 
more annoyance about it than true regret. And it is this 
12 
nuance that condemn him". 
The utter absurdity of life is indicated by 
Meursault's utter rejection of one life-situation or 
life-style for another one. All life-situations and 
life-styles or states of affairs are as good or as bad as 
any. How can we sit in judgement on a particular 
life-situation and pronounce it either good or bad. 
Kierkegaard in his exposition of the existential dial-ectic 
trifurcates human life into aesthetic, ethical and religious 
stages. It so seems that he regards religious stage to be 
higher than the aesthetic stage. It is so because Kierkegaard 
affirms mans' relationship to God and God as revealed in 
scriptural texts becomes the ultimate standard of 
justification. However Camus's character i.e. Meursault fails 
to differentiate in between various given situations of life. 
Possibily it sounds presumptuous to him to accept religious 
or ethical criterion to be justifying or presiding factors 
that are widely believed to be controlling and guiding in 
multiplex given situations of life. Meursault is a sceptic as 
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well as a nihilist. Possibly he thinks that it is we who 
confer meanings and values to various life-situations and 
contexts. Our judgements are arbitrary and lacking in any 
authority. We can choose among various alternatives but all 
alternatives are devoid of any logic or meaning, e.g. when 
Meursault's boss asks him about going over to Paris and 
attend to a business project over there, adding that he was a 
young man and Parisian life must be more attractive for him, 
Meursault replies; ...."you could never change your life, 
that in any case one life was as good as another and that I 
13 
wasn't all dissatisfied with mine here. Meursault further 
muses with himself, "he looked upset and told me that I 
always evaded the question and that I had no ambition, which 
was disastrous in the business world. So I went back to work. 
I would rather not have upset him, but I could not see any 
reason for changing ray life. Come to think of it, I wasn't 
unhappy. When I was a student, I had plenty of that sort of 
ambition. But when I had to give up my studies I very soon 
realised that none of it really mattered." 
Meursault's indifference to accepted social standards 
and values could be deeply disturbing to the standard-bearers 
of a given social order, e.g. any given society accepts 
values such as love, fellow-feeling, cooperation, mutual 
trust, compassion, kindness, and fidelity to be guiding and 
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controlling standards to which all individuals are 
expected to conform to and abide by. Especially the 
institution of marriage is deemed to be the corner-stone 
of a civilized social order. Corresponding to this 
institution any individual must have feelings of respect 
and reverence and one should approach this institution 
with a definite sense of responsibility. If one cannot 
observe the given set of norms and standards, one 
questions the fundamentals of any collective 
life-situation. Moreover customs and traditions do play a 
vital role in sustenance and up-keep of institutional 
life. However when Meursault is asked by Marie whether he 
wanted to marry her, he reveals an attitude that seems to 
question the very normative structure of society. 
Meursault's reply is astonishing to our conventional 
social conscience, "I said I did not mind and we could do 
if she wanted to. She then wanted to know if I loved her. 
I replied as I had done once already, that it did not mean 
anything but that I probably did not. 'Why marry me then?' 
she said. I explained to her that it really did not matter 
and that if she wanted to. We could get married. Anyway, 
she was the one who was asking me and I was simply saying 
yes. She then remarked that marriage was a serious matter. 
I said, 'No'. She did not say anything for a moment 
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and looked at me in silence. Then she spoke. She just 
wanted to know if I would have accepted the same proposal, 
if it had come from another woman with whom I had a 
similar relationship. I said, 'Naturally'. She then said 
she wondered if she loved me as well, I had no idea about 
that. After another moments' silence, she mumbled that I 
was peculiar, that was probably why she loved me but that 
one day I might disgust her for the very same reason" 
Meursault's involvement in a violent incident leads 
to his subsequent arrest and cross examination by judicial 
authorities. However Meursault does not defend himself, 
argue for himself or refute the charges leveled by the 
prosecution. He doesn't plead guilty nor does he say 
anything with a view to save his skin. When a lawyer tells 
him that people describe him as being taciturn and 
withdrawn, he answeres, "It is just that I never have much 
to say. So I keep quiet" 
The most unacceptable feature of Meursault's 
behaviour is that he does not feel repentent for his 
action. Even when he was shown a silver crucifix 
symbolizing the suffering of Christ, he doesn't feel 
stirred up. The Magisterate invokes God who is ever 
Benevolent and Compassionate to guilty and pardons them if 
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they repent and are ready to receive His grace. Meursault 
fails to appreciate the logic of this discourse and is not 
able to follow the significance of these theological 
considerations. Meursault courageously confesses that he 
does not believe in God and this sends shivers down the 
spine of Magisterate. To the Magisterate who represents 
the prevailling social conscience and judicial norms, 
belief in God seems to be unavoidable and inevitable. Our 
actions may not confirm to the standards prescribed by 
scriptures yet belief in God seems to him to be 
unquestionable. The whole drama of existence becomes 
meaningless without our beleiving in God, so thinks the 
Magisterate. However Meursault remains unmoved by these 
arguments, "He told me that it was impossible, that all 
men believed in God, even those who would not face upto 
Him^ that was his belief and if he should ever doubt it, 
his life would become meaningless, 'do you want my life to 
be meaningless?' he cried. As far as I was concerned it 
17 had nothing to do with me and I told him so" . Meursault, 
in the eyes of the Jury and Public at large was a hardened 
criminal. He was so hardened that he was not even moved at 
the sight of the symbol of suffering i.e. crucifix. To top 
it all, Meursault refusese to recognize his criminalty and 
refuses to regret what he had done. Even when finally the 
chaplian walks in to extract j.epe-n-tence from Meursault for 
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his gravest of the crimes, Meursault refuses to see him, 
in view of the fact that he does not believe in God. 
Meursault points out to the Chaplian that he was 
absolutely sure that Gods' being or not being there did 
not interest him at all. He was not in despair but only a 
bit afraid as natural as that. When Chaplain reminds 
Meursault that every man in despair turns towards God, he 
remarks that it was upto them. It also proved that they 
could spare the time. As per him, he did not want anyone 
to help him and time was the very thing that he did not 
have for talking, and taking interest in what did not 
interest him. The Chaplian assures him that human system 
of justice was nothing and. Divine Justice was everything. 
Meursault points out that it was human system that had 
condemned him. The Chaplian pointed out that even the 
capital punishment would not wash away his sin. Meursault 
replies that he did not know what a sin means and he only 
knew that he had been pronounced to be guilty and so had 
to pay for it. Thus we find Meursault refusing to 
acknowledge the validity, relevence and significance of 
a religious outlook on life; deeply offensive it might 
sound to conventional wisdom. Meursault finds the very 
concept of God to be symbolizing the monopoly of the 
establishment and all those who stand for it. He finds 
himself in a forgotten, forlorn, loveless and pointless 
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universe in which even spiritual symbols have been 
appropriated by irrational social forces. When the Chaplian 
finally again reminds him of God, Meursault bursts out, 
" " I did not have much time left. I did not want to 
waste it on God. He tried to change the subject by asking me 
why I wasn't calling him "Father". That irritated me and I 
told him that he wasn't my father : he was on the same side 
1 Q 
as the others". 
During the cross examination, shades of Meursault's 
character are revealed that violate the conventional and 
customary morality deemed to be approprate for all-times to 
come by the public opinion. It is revealed that Meursault 
revels in the pleasures of life on the very next day when 
his mother passes away. Besides swimming and watching a film 
by Fernandel, he enters into an active physical 
relationship with Marie. Such a behaviour on the part of 
Meursault is deemed sufficient by the prosecutor to condemn 
him to death. The prosecutor addresses the Jury in these 
words, "Gentlemen of the Jury, on the day after the death of 
his mother, this man was swimming in the sea, entering into 
an irregular liaison and laughing at a Fernandel film. I 
19 have nothing more to say to you" 
The prosecution makes a very strong case against 
Meursault. They find a strong link between 'Meursaults' way 
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of hurrying his mother and his killing of a man. The 
prosecution argues that their exists a profound, tragic and 
vital relationship between the one crime and the other. 
They accuse Meursault of hurrying his mother like a 
heartless criminal. He is pronounced to he not only 
heartless but also soul-less. They find him brefet of 
humanity, gentleness, kindness and love. He is lacking in 
moral principles and as well devoid of any spiritual outlook 
on human situation. As Meursault is an unrepentent and 
stubborn violator of all that human civilization stands for, 
he should be given strictest of punishments and not shown 
any mercy or kindness in view of his atrocious behaviour. 
What is important is to meet out the ends of justice and not 
be misled by the so called value of tolerance. Talking 
about the soul of Meursault the prosecution states, "He 
said he had peered into it and found nothing, gentlemen of 
the Jury. He said the truth was that I did not have one, a 
Soul, and that I had no access to any humanity nor to any of 
the moral principle, which protect to the human heart. 'Of 
course'. He added, 'we can hardly reapproach him for this. 
We can hardly complain that he lacks something, he was never 
able to acquire. But here in this court the wholly negative 
ethic of tolerance must give way to the stricter hut loftier 
ethic of justice. Especially when we encounter a man whose 
heart is so empty that it forms a chasm which threatens to 
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engulf society" . Therefore in view of the same, Meursault 
must be punished accordingly. He had no place in a society 
whose most fundamental rules he had ignored. Any possible 
appeal on his part on humanitarian grounds need to be 
rejected out rightly because he knows nothing of the most 
basic human relations. 
Meursault on his part finds any attempt to appeal 
against the capital punishment pointless and meaningless. He 
accepts death as the most basic fact of life and even finds 
no special fascination for going on living as much as 
possible. In point of fact life itself is devoid of any 
significance and we are caught into the vortex of existence 
without any reason or rhyme. What is important is to explore 
the logic or justification of living then to go on living as 
per routine or conventional wisdom. And it is impossible to 
find any possible justification of life. If we say that we 
live because of the blind will to live; it is an admission 
of ignorance rather than a statement of justification. On an 
imminant death punishment Meursault soliloquises with 
himself, "But everybody knows that life isn't worth living. 
And when it came down to it, I was not unaware of the fact 
that it does not matter very much whether you die at thirty 
or at seventy since, in either case, other men and women 
will naturally go on living, for thousands of years 
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even Given that you have got to die, it obviously 
21 doesn't matter exactly how or when" 
Meursault is an outsider. He suffers from what may 
be called communication gap at ontic level. He doesn't 
understand the significance of rules and regulations that 
our conventional social orders are governed by. On the other 
hand, the society at large as represented by judicial, 
legal, and institutional authorities, fail to appreciate 
his utter lack of concern for time-honoured customs and 
conventions. Meursault muses with himself about the 
significance and meaning of existence at both human and 
cosmic levels and is deeply involved with the question of 
significance of it all on an ontological level. On the other 
hand society is governed by laws, conventions, rules, 
considerations and reflexes which can never be justified by 
reference to any ultimate standard of justification. Those 
who think in theological terms and seem certain of 
everything are in possession of worthless certainities, so 
opines Meursault. On the other hand, Meursault might seem 
to be empty-handed; he was sure of himself, sure of 
everything, sure of his life, and sure of the death that was 
coming to him. Meursault as an out-sider lived in a certain 
way and he could just as well have lived in a different way. 
He had done this and he hadn't done that. He hadn't done 
onething whereas he had done another. So what ? Life lived 
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from any angle or outlook is, in the final analysis, as 
absurd a phenomenon; as "A tale told by an idoit, full of 
sound and fury, signifying nothing". 
Through the character of Meursault, projected as an 
outsider, a rebel, violator of all that sounds 
conventionally normal, Camus tries to bring out the 
existential crisis of a person who is not affraid of a 
loveless and meaningless universe. The outsider has lots of 
existential courage to face the imperatives necessitated by 
a deaf^ dumb and unsmiling universe seemingly governed by 
insurmountable forces of darkness. Society on its part has 
tried to project certain conventional symbols and 
existential metaphors with a view to regulate its ongoing 
march. However, any person x.no doesn't find himself in 
accord with these conventions and metaphors is proclaimed to 
be an outsider and condemned to intolerable but avoidable 
suffering. Such a life-situation, for Camus, is 
self-evidently absurd and shorn of any significance. 
What camus puts in La Peste is a forlorn confusion 
at the absurdity of life. The novel is a factual account 
reminscent of Journalism, of the plague in the 1940 S in 
French port on Algerian coast. The plague is the early 
concept of the absurd, a secularised sense of tragedy and an 
analysis of the way a meaningless death gratituously calls 
into question a life without meaning, or a life amounting at 
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22 best, to no more than death. It can be read at different 
levels - a stark description of the plague and at a deeper 
level as a depiction of the absurdity of life where vital 
living has been restrained by habits. The description of the 
rats and the reactions of the people, show how habits 
restrain commen-sense. The dead rats are meaningless and not 
associated with the wide spread plague. 
The story of the novel is a telling commentary on 
the absurd life-situation man is caught in. Dr. Rieux, wo is 
the surgeon narrator of the novel starts the story by 
discovering a dead rat. The story ends with several 
thousands of dead rats plus the plague's first 
death-monsieur Michel. As the story progresses the situation 
worseness. Day in and day out more and more rats and flees 
die and scavengers have a tough time, in clearing them. One 
day it so happens that rats from all quarters spring up on 
roads, basements, cellars, and sewers and die in thousands. 
One could hear the shrill of little dearth cries of the 
rats. Even in the posh areas of the town one could find them 
in heaps. After every clean up the rats would again appear 
in increasing numbers and people started crying for 
extra-ordinary official measures to combat this menace. The 
offical reaction is thoroughly routinized and bureaucratic. 
A friend of Dr. Rieux; Jean Tarron is the only person who 
keeps a note book on the progress of plague and can sense 
the significance of tile dying rats and their decaying bodies. 
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As the plague starts taking its toll Rieux and Tarron 
discover another plague like phenomenon - the red-tape of 
bureaucracy. Dr. Rieus is convinced that persons suffering 
from unidentified fever should be isolated. However, he 
cannot do anything in view of the fact that his colleagues 
insist that they have no definite proof that the fever is 
highly infectious. The Doctor cannot certify what the 
disease is although horrified at the daily toll which the 
disease takes. The doctor discovers that the 
local magisterate need also to be consulted in this regard. 
The municipal officials are also taking it easy. The people 
in general are leading a monotonous life, almost like 
mechanical roberts. There is an all round lack of 
understanding of the gravity of the situation. 
Thus the novel The plaque has an allegorical 
significance. It is an allegory on the meaning of living and 
meaning of death. Life is not a bed of roses but at least as 
bad as the plague. Realization of the essential tragic 
character of the existence is the only feature worth 
eulogising, infact the only redeeming feature. The central 
theme of the novel is again the absurdity of human 
existence. The rats examplify common people and the 
indifferent bureaucracy and government represent the 
indifference of the universal order if any to the deepest 
86 
predicament of human struggle. Again Camus reverts to his 
favourite theme by depicting man as caught in the coils of 
existence and forsaken and forgotten by the unconcerned 
gods he has been believing in. Again human existence is 
represented as alienated in view of the overwhelming 
absurdity of human condition - a condition where everybody 
seems diseased and yet everybody seems unconcerned about 
everybody. 
Even in Camu' s Caligula we find tragedies and 
sufferings of human existence. Caligula is a play about the 
young Roman emperor who brutally kills his courtiers, kt the 
outset of the play Caligula is shocked by the death of his 
sister, Drusulla, with whom he has been having an 
incenstuous love affair. He sets out to revenge her death in 
a rivalry of killing that lasts unitil he is assassinated by 
the particians he has tormented. 
Caligula is deemed to be a philosophical drama. The 
emperor's antogonists are the gods rather than the 
patricians. The actions of Caligula are presented not as 
examples of pathologica-l behaviour but as an instance of the 
human condition. Drusilla's death has plunged caligula into 
a dualistic universe where he is confronted by otherness. He 
claims to kill with a view to liberate Romans who are 
trapped by habit. They must be made to confront the 
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otherness of the unvierse in order to overcome it. However, 
•Caligula hardly cares to actuate any change of mind or 
behaviour in Romans. He has a personal god. Drusilla's death 
has demonstrated that man is at the mercy of the gods; his 
only significant acts are those which assume the God's 
prerogatives, namely suicide and murder. There is a link 
between violence and totality. Caligula has a death wish. He 
feels a kinship with his victims and he courts 
assassination. Conversly he kills in order to achieve the 
immortality which the gods have until now, kept for 
themselves. 
Caligula cannot bear the pain that he feels : my 
skin hurts me, my chest and limbs too I have only 
to move my tongue and ever;, ching turns black and people 
23 become loathsome to me" . This is the anguish of man's 
mortal condition and calligula has a special place in 
Camus' early writtings in view of the same. Sisyphee finds 
reasons to be happy while Stranger depicts mortality as an 
absence^ in Calligula it is presented as a mind trapped in a 
confrontation with what it is not. Since the emperor cannot 
stand this he is overwhelmed by hatred of others and of 
himself. Yet murder offers no solution because the 
murderer's supposed joy is as finite as everything else. 
When he has killed one person Caligula, like all other 
terrorists has no choice but to kill some one else. Whatever 
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he does, he remains an object of hatred to himself. In one 
act Caligula destroys the mirror confronting him as he can 
no longer stand the sight of himself, 'it is always you I 
24 
meet, you are always there opposite me and I hate you' 
Caligula cannot bear the burden of guile. Everyone is guilty 
because there are no judges who could declare that men are 
innocent. 
Thus in Caligula Camus does not merely bring out 
the meaninglessness of life but makes death and tragedies of 
human existence the core and crux of this dramma. He says 
that 'Death is an ordinary incident. While uttering this I 
25 take oath that it is the definite simple reality.' Human 
suffering in an absurd world is central to the theme of the 
dramma. 
Le Mythe de Sis/phe is a philosophical essay wich 
explores the existential predicament of man. In this novel 
Sisyphus is a Greek mythological character who was accused 
of having divulged secret of gods. He had seen Jupiter 
kidnapping Isma - the daughter of Esyphus which he reported 
to her father. The gods had condemned Sisyphus to spend 
eternity pushing a rock up a hill and watching it roll back 
down when it reached the top. Sisyphus' conditon according 
to Camus, constitutes what may be called the state of the 
absurd. Apparently Le mythe de sisyphe is a novel about 
suicide, but in point of fact it is not. Camus' Sisyphus 
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attains an identity by asserting that he is not a stone and 
that he is not at one with the universe as well. The message 
of the novel tells man that he can go on living because he 
has had the courage to give up the quest for primeval 
innocence and can confront his condition. In so far as he is 
aware of the centradiction between his need for oneness and 
the finite world, to that extent he is a man. This dichotomy 
constitutes both, the origin of anguish and source of 
values. Accepting the fact that there are no mataphysically 
guaranteed directives for conduct, could generate a positive 
ethic. And Camus belived that absurdity in the sense of 
recongnition of this fact, could by itself generate a 
positive ethic. In particular the ideal of human fraternity 
was connected with Camus' heroic nihilism on the grounds 
that to accept oneself as the sole guarantor of one's own 
values would necessarily involve accepting a principle of 
respect for other human beings. It is here, however that 
Camus ecountered a very serious difficulty. He found it 
necessary to show by means of examples just what the 
specific implications for conduct of his doctrine of 
absurdity are and also make it plausible that these 
implications are consistent with the humanistic ideal to 
which he as an individual is fully devoted. "In Myth of 
Sisyphus however, the specimens that are offered of the mood 
of life appropriate to the absurd man bear only a rather 
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removed affinity to that ideal or for that matter to any 
general social ethic". Camus did not demonstrate 
satisfactorily either that the kind of life that followed 
from an acceptence of nihilism bore any clear relation to 
his own moral ideals or that a life dedicated to these 
ideals could be adequately motivated by an acceptance or 
absurdity. 
Through the story of Sisyphus, Camus has tried to 
convey that man in this universe is condemned like Sisyphus 
to perennial struggle which delivers no results. In fact Le 
myth de Sisyphe is a story of human destiny and Sisyphus 
symbolizes the meaninglessness and absurdity of both human 
life and universal order. Man is in a continious journey but 
reaches nowhere. Human life is a story of ceaseless 
suffering. Man would like to make his life pleasant and 
peaceful by following great ideals and vlaues. However, he 
encounters hurdels at everystep and all his projects are 
doomed to failure and extinction. Man is subser^ /ant to 
certain blind forces which cannot be exactly pin-pointed. 
All human and social ideals turn out to be farcical. The 
practical life cares a fig for our ideals and values. We 
can't liberate ourselves from this life-situation even by 
faithfully following all the best ideals of the world. There 
is no point in involving the blessings of God for there is 
none. We are surrounded by opaque hurdles and impassable 
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walls. There is no logical or rational justificaiton for 
these hurdles. All human endeavour is futile. Man seems to 
be a toy in the hands of destiny and death seems to be the 
only exit from the torture chamber of existence. This view 
of human existence as culled out from Camu's writtings is a 
devastatingly radical reinterpretation of human condition in 
the overall scheme of so called universal order. Everything 
seems to be arbitrary or at best recommendatory. Human 
existence is a continuous confrontation with a universe, 
oozing out, so to say, absurdity from all its pores. No 
interpretation, no viewpoint and no theoretical construction 
seems to clinch the issue. Man is robbed of his 
mataphysical garments and finds himself naked of;ineaning and 
innocent of value in contemporary life-situation. 
As pointed out by Patrick McCarthy, "The simplest 
definition of the absurd would be rephrasing of Descartes' 
proposition, "I think therefore I am". Camus might have 
stated that, "I am another to myself, therefore I am'. The 
absurd is not a state to be overcome because it represents a 
victory over the previous state of suicidal mysticism. Yet it 
remains a religious vision because man does not forget his 
need for God and becomes apragmatist who is content to give 
a shape to his earthly existence. Camus'originality lays in 
his attempt to preserve man's religious sense although it 
could not be satisfied and to make him live in the absence 
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of God" 
The real meaning of Sisyphee is expressed in 
lyrical passages which depict the absurd as an adventure. We 
must accept the heart-rending marvellous gamble of the 
absurd, make a serious effort to do it and face the blast of 
consequences thereof. Only then will man's body, his 
nobility, his tenderness etc. recover their place in this 
absurd world. His greatness will be nourished by the wine of 
absurd and the bread of indifference. For Camus the absurd 
is the conflict between man's desire for meaning and the 
shapelessness of his condition. Dignity is the way to 
transcent that condition. Sisyphus attains it when he 
affirms his superiority over the rocks. 
Camus believed that the absurd could itself be the 
source of values. L. myth de sisphee sets out the new code 
of moral, political and Aesthetic revolt. Camus reveals his 
deep moral sense when he affirms that, although man can not 
know himself he is capable of behaving morally. His starting 
point should be the liberation that comes from the absurd. 
If transcendentalism is abandoned, man can turn to his life 
with greater Zest. 
Camus' novels and dramas are not written for the 
sake of Art. Nor do they preach any new-fangled idealogy. 
His works bring out the significant social, political, and 
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philosophical problems of modern age. They reflect the 
deepest issues of human existence. Such questions as; why 
should man undergo so much suffering; what are the factors 
responsible for human suffering; are those factors external 
and circumstantial or internal and personal; are values or 
ideas inspired by genuine and authentic commitment or 
motivated by selfishness, hyprocrisy, and economic profit 
etc; are addressed to in his writtings and his novels 
revolve round them. His responses and reflections to these 
questions add upto what may be called absurdism. This 
philosophy of absurdism is possibly a function of the crises 
of contemporary civilization. And the concept of this 
absurdism leads man to the concept of outsider. The basic 
problem of "The outsider" is his instinctive rejection of 
the everyday world, a feeling that it is somehow boring and 
unsatisfying like a hypnotized man eating saw dust under the 
28 belief that it is eggs and bacon. Actually, the 
outsider's sense of unreality cuts off his freedom in an 
unreal world as it is to jump while one is falling. Freedom 
being an intensity of will is not something to do what one 
likes and will depends upon motive. If there is no motive, 
there is no willing. One cannot do anything unless he 
believes that to be meaningful. And belief must be believed 
on the existence of something, in other words we can say 
belief is concerned with what is Real. Beliefs are born out 
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of our convictions about the Reality of the Things we are 
surrounded by, when nothing is or seems real, how can we 
against all the pressures of our so-called conscience as 
well as common-sense go on deluding ourselves to live and 
die for any set of beliefs. An existential illumination or 
analysis leads us to postulate that we are living in an 
unreal world and we accept this unreality in the marrow of 
our being. This sense of unreality kinders us from 
participating in life and we become alienated from those who 
participate and so we become outsiders. 
CHAPTER IV 
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF CAMUS' CONCEPT OF ALIENATION 
It will be highly hazardous to try to bring out the 
features of Camus' thought in a systematic philosophical 
frame. It is so because Camus is not a systematic 
Philosopher. He is basically a literateur who has emphasized 
certain existential themes in his novels and dramas. We can 
only try to summarize some of his prominent themes in order 
to pin-point Camus's place in the 20th century intellectual 
mileu. 
Firstly, Camus' is an Absurdist. The universe 
according to Camus is an inscrutable and incomprehensible 
manifold. All our attempts to understand it are doomed to 
frustration. We may work out various interpretations but they 
will lack the necessary authority we need to bring out what 
may be called a consistent and coherent philosophy of life. 
All historical religions sand contemporary ideologies are 
sailing in the same methodological boat. Historically 
speaking men have believed in various religious world-views 
and accordingly derived their value systems from them. 
However with increasing methodological sophistication modern 
man has outgrown the religious dogmas that served as the 
bedrock of ancient and medievia'l civilizations. Modern man 
finds himself in a world which seems essentially meaningless 
to him. Therefore he is alienated from him moorings and ideals 
which previously lent meaning to his existence. 
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The fundamental thesis of Absurdism is that the world 
is, in essence, an incomprehensible phenomenon. We have no 
access to any so called "Transcendent". Men can communicate 
only with other men. Absurdist humanism therefore postulates 
the solidarity of all men in face of the incomprehensible - a 
principle easy to formulate, but infinitely difficult to 
apply as long as so few people understand it clearly. It 
stipulates that man should not presecute other men in the 
name of too confidently held religious, political or 
historical assumptions. This, by and large, is the doctrine 
put forward by Camus in La Peste, where he uses the symbol of 
the plague, perhaps too broadly, to represent all forms of 
evil; both human misdemeanours and natural disasters or "acts 
of God". 
However he wasn't a pure absudist because in L'Homme 
Revolte, he falls back onto the misleading Romantic concept of 
la revolte or rebellion, of which he distinguishes two main 
forms ;La revolte metaphysicque and la revolte politique. The 
second form makes sense, if we take it to mean, in sober 
terms, that every individual has the right to try to improve 
the society around him for his own good and for that of his 
fellow men, but the first form is literally absurd, and 
contrary to true Absurdism, since we cannot rebel against the 
universe/at the most we can opt out by committing suicide, but 
that is a poor form of rebellion, which in any case Camus 
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had already rejected in his earlier treatise, Le Mythe de 
sisyphe. The fact that he got himself entangled in la revolte 
metaphysiquie and made in certain amount of play with dubious 
figures, such as the Marquis de sade shows that like Sartre, 
he wasn't a total nonbeliever, but rather an athiest or 
crypto-deist, that is someone who clings to the ghost of God 
as a source of negative emotion. 
Secondly in view of the above we can say that Camus 
was Nihilist. In view of the fact that there was no ultimate 
moral standard by reference to which our modes of life or 
actions can be justified, modern man is caught in the vortex 
of an ethical predicament. All value systems, legal 
frame-works and socio-political arguments are purely 
recommendatory or have no mandatory force Therefore, nothing 
can be justified. For example Meursault of Estranger finds it 
impossible to make any sense of the life-situation he is 
caught in. The death of his mother, his affair with Merri , 
his killing of an Arab and his subsquent condemnation to 
death; all seem discordant and disconnected peices of his 
life-situation which seem to him making no sense. He cannot 
pin-point his sin and therefore he finds his condemnation to 
death to be a meaningless response to an equally meaningless 
crime he is accused of having comitted in the first place. 
Why should he undergo the conventional modes of behaviour 
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or display socially approved responses 
when he can make neither head nor tail of his whole 
life-situation. Death, sex, violence, and his personal 
imminent death leave him cold, untouched and baffled. The 
case of the prosecution and subsequent judicial 
investigation culminating in his death, he finds absurd and 
pointless and therefore he does not defend himself. When 
prosecution is meaningless, the con-comitant defence would be 
equally pointless. Thus Meursault symbalizes man caught into 
the fetters of meaninglessness. Human actions corresponding 
to which may follow judicial rewards or punishments make no 
sense. We may visualize the entire universe to be an 
incessant arena of action and believed in afterworld a 
chamber of legal cross-examination, where supposed righteous 
actions are rewarded and unrighteous actions are punished. 
Meursault as characterized in Stranger challenges this 
entire bi-cameral cosmic situation; firstly by refusing to 
understand the significance of it all and secondly by 
non-cooperating with the whole theatre of the Absurd. Camus 
through Meursault tries to communicate the utter Absurdity 
and non-sensicality of this entire cosmic dramma. Thus he 
tries to bracket all beliefs and values as absurd and 
meaningless. 
The metaphysical Absurdism and moral nihilism intro-
duces us to modern man who from all angles is an alienated 
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person. The cold world metaphysical and theological 
explanations have lost their sense. However, as the universe 
is as it has always been, man finds himself encountring it as 
a phenomenon of inexhaustable mystery. As he has the same 
social, political and economic actions to perform and 
projects to undertake, he is badly in need of a system of 
values which he can justify by recourse to some ultimate 
metaphysical standard which standard unfortunately slips all 
his interpretations every time. Thus modern man is completely 
Alienated not only from metaphysical and theological world 
views, moral outlooks, and ideological visions but also from 
his own self, in view of the fact that all his 
self-definitions were provided by classical metaphysics and 
theology. We are caught into a universe which is devoid of 
meaning and significance and all its supposed meanings have 
been ascribed to it by us. 
Critical Evaluation : 
Philosophical arguments when pitched to the extreme 
lead to such abstract and context-free generalizations where 
both-sides of the dispute are left to gasp for the breath. 
Philosophical problems do a->-ise from the multiple contexts 
of life but every typical philosophical debate is decontex-
tualised from the concrete life-situation. Philosophers • 
usually search for the Absolute; Absolute Knowledge, Absolute 
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Truth, Absolute Freedom, Absolute Value and Absolute 
Criterion of justification. As human understanding is 
incapable of arriving at the Absolute and is always condemned 
to contextual and relative standards, philosophers end up as 
sceptics or nihilists. On the epistemological plane when they 
cannot find an Ultimate Standard of knowledge and truth, they 
become sceptics. Similarly, when they fail to grasp the 
Ultimate Criterion of justification of ethical values they 
turn out to be Nihilists. The scepticism and nihilism are 
thus a function of man's inability to justify either the 
truth claims of natural, social and normative sciences, or 
the social, political and economic actions, that he 
undertakes within a sociohistorical setting. Existentialists 
such as Schopenhaur, Neitzsche, Heidegger, Sartre and Camus 
etc., in their various contexts have all brought out the 
excruciatingly painful human condition where no Absolute 
Standard of justification for man's social, political and 
economic behaviour can be exactly pin-pointed. They have 
found that man is caught in a situation where he has choices 
or alternatives but no choice or alternative can lay claim on 
Absolute Value. Therefore, man's moral choices are always 
arbitrary and thus any life-style is as good or as bad as any 
other. Camus in his novels has forcefully brought out various 
features of this life-situation. 
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The Outsider or The Stranger as symbolized by 
Meursault is a person pitted against a meaningless, pointless 
and purposeless universe. He accepts his life-situation as it 
is and finds no justification to confirm to norms sanctified 
by history and tradition. The Stranger is a person who is in 
search of an ultimate standard which can clinch all moral, 
social and political controversies and prove once for all the 
absolute validity and significance of a particular life-style 
or life-situation. 
Such an attitude is born out of bracketing all the 
contextual frames of reference. Although, there are no cutting 
arguments for or against a particular world-view and value 
system, yet there are vital considerations that help us in 
organizing a hierarchy of values. For example conventional 
wisdom is born out of man's historical experience which has 
been a long-drawn-cut confrontation between the human order 
and the natural order. Values are crystallized or articulated 
through historical combinations and permutations. Such 
values as truth, beauty, goodness, justice, kindness, love, 
compassion, fellowfeeling, sympathy etc. are not arbitrarily 
imposed ideas on man by some superhuman agency. We may be 
believing in a particular religious world-view or value 
system but that is beside the point. Religion, as a matter of 
fact, does recommend a value system in consonance with its 
world-view. However, the crucial point is that values are 
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born out of social contract and historical interaction. 
Rules, regulations, norms, values and Ideals are unavoidable 
in man's onward march of civilization. The very social order 
responsible for man's culturalization depends upon a 
normative structure. If we cannot differentiate between 
values that preserve man and disvalues that destroy his very 
fabric, we are no more entitled to a human order where man 
can, persue his multiple assignments. Man's rationality is 
not an accident of history, rather it is the fruit of a along 
drawn out confrontation with natural and historical forces. 
This rational intuition discriminates between what is good 
and what is bad. The very fact that man is a rational being 
places on him, a set of limits, a set of values, and a sense 
of responsibility. Values may not have a metaphysical 
justification but they do have social, political, economic 
and legal relevance. The search for an Ultimate Standard of 
justification seems to be a form of escapism. We are here and 
now engaged in various social, political and economic 
struggles. There is alround, exploitation of man by man and 
enslavement of one by another. Social inequalities, political 
injustices and economic exploitation abound. We know that 
society needs to be reoriented on social egalitarianism, 
political justice and economic redistribution. We cannot 
afford to go on asking for an Ultimate Standard of 
justification of all that we undertake or want to carry out. 
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Social criteria and morals are established by historical 
experience and recongnised and understood to be so by our 
commonsense and rational intuition. We don't need a 
metaphysical proof for the validation of values. Even if God 
is dead everything is not permitted. Man is not competent to 
discover the rationality of the universe. However, it does 
not mean that we are not rational persons. We may not be able 
to explore the meaningfulness of life and world. However, it 
does not mean that every person is not competent to ma/.e his 
own life meaningful. 
Camus and some other existentialist writers go on in 
search of an absolute justificatory standard or criterion. 
However, they miss the trees in the jungle. We can 
legitemately ask for the meaning of this or that action but a 
metaphysical search for the ultimate meaning is fruitless. 
Every action has to be judged in the light of its own 
context. Camus like other existentialists draws upon boundary 
situations. It is people living in loneliness and doubt who 
provide the charcters for existentialist novels. The 
existentialist conceptual psychology rests upon examples 
drawn from extreme situations. They treat the exceptional as 
the typical. The contrast between exceptional and the typical 
cannot be and should not be obliterated or lost sight of. 
Meursault as projected in Stranger is also an exceptional 
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character. He challenges the very structure of conventional 
morals by being indifferent to life-situation or 
world-situation. He refuses to play the game within the 
framework of conventional standards. In the process, he is 
alienated not only from his beloved and his friends but from 
his mother as well. He is indifferent to what seems to him 
to be a Godless universe. Therefore, he refuses to accept the 
dictates of the system he is operating in. Ultimately he 
becomes indifferent to his person and seriously ponders over 
the futility of a monotonous and routinized life. He refuses 
to defend himself in the court of law and remains the silent 
spectator to the ongoing judicial proceedings where the 
prosecution waxes eloquent arguments against him. Such a chara-
cterisation seems to be an over-dramatization of the 
exceptional. 
ii) Existentialist thinkers and writers like Heidegger 
Satre and Camus have developed a powerful critiqlie of 
classical metaphysical formulations by emphasizing the 
centrality of human existence in the universal scheme of 
things. Human existence becomes the starting-point of all 
philosophising. However, such a starting" point may itself 
lead us to reductionism which may not be acceptable to us all 
in view of the absence of a compelling set of reasons which 
can necessitate the centrality of existence with complete 
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justification. Human existence cannot be accepted as an 
Absolute in itself. If we do so, we shall be missing the very 
understanding of human existence in the over-all scheme of 
things. Human existence is a part of cosmic state of affairs. 
The cosmos includes various layers or orders of reality. We 
have the physical or natural ' order, the biological' order, 
the psychological order, the social order, the economic 
order, the political order etc. All these orders are 
interlinked and interwoven. A holistic perspective entails 
that we accept all the orders of reality as they present or 
unfold themselves to us. We cannot select a prticular level 
or layer of reality or emphasize it at the cost of other 
spheres . of reality. For example, we do have mathematical 
equations and logical conclusions, which can be demonstrated 
categorically by recourse to the appropriate deductive 
method. Similarly laws of Nature can be directly or 
indirectly verified by recourse to laboratorical 
experimentation. The social sciences which study the social, 
political and economic questions are getting increasingly 
standardized by the application of scientific methods and 
techniques. However, when we come to the normative issues or 
value-questions, we are confronted by a field situation where 
no definitive, categorical and conclusive results and 
standards can be discovered or arrived at. However, social 
existence or historical setting of man is as significant as 
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his individual existence. Individual existence cannot be 
totally decontextualized and given a piece-meal treatment. 
Social existence on which depends our individual existence 
seems to foster a set of values which may be amenable to 
logico-mathematical demonstration or emprical verification 
but which seem to be the very postulates or presuppositions 
of any type of human existence at all. For example, such 
values as love, compassion, kindness, tolerance etc., may not 
be completely justifiable on epistemological or 
methodological grounds. However, such values seem to be 
justifeable on existential grounds; only those existential 
grounds need not necessarily stem from a consideration of 
individual existence. They can be derived from the 
imperatives, the intangibles and the imponderables of our 
collective or social existence. It is our social and 
historical experience which leads to an existential 
validation of values and norms. Such questions as to whether 
values are meaninful or meaningless, whether human existence 
is significant or not, whether cosmic situation is pointless 
or teleologically oriented whether man should do this or that 
etc., are devastatingly undecidable existential dilemmas. 
However, balanced and judicious answers to these questions 
can be given only by recourse to our long-drawn-out 
socio-historical experience. Each one of us cannot afford to 
subtract the entire socio-historical setting of these 
questions and start every time afresh. Camus and others like 
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him do underline the centrality of individual existence to 
the extent that they become unaware of the entire furniture 
of the universe. Individual episteomological apparatus i.e. 
interaction of human sense-experience and reason, is 
competent enough to understand the logical, mathematical, 
scientific and social scientific findings and results. But as 
it is, no individual can arrogate to himself the competence 
to single-mindedly and single-handedly grasp the relevance 
and meaningfulness of norms and values in human life. It is 
through exposure to socio-historical experience or education 
that we can appreciate the compelling existential logic of 
values, without being able to furnish a cutting set of 
arguments which can conclusively demonstrate the 
metaphysical or transcendental nature of values. In such a 
situation it is easier to be led into scepticism, nihilism 
and propagate explicitly or implicitly a viewpoint called 
Absurdism. Such an individual is bound to feel alienated in a 
universe which seems mysterious to all intents and purposes 
and where God seems either to be absent or silent or (as one 
of the characters of the Plague depicts God to be) a dumb 
spectator of the cosmic situation where man is caught in the 
coils of his multiple concerns and engagements. 
It is true that there are no incontestible arguments 
in support of a particular world-view and consequent 
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value-system. All world-views and value-systems are, in the 
final analysis, functions or products of various 
interpretations. However, no interpretation can ever hope to 
reach even the level of inductive certainty enjoyed by 
statements or Laws of Science not to speak of the 
irrepudiability of logico-mathematical statements. A philo-
sophical interpretation is worked out by recourse to a close 
examination of the basic features of cosmos and human 
condition, viz; Life and death, unity and diversity, hope and 
despair, perceptual experience and conceptual unification, 
power and helplessness, purposive activity and impulsive 
reaction, understandability and apacity, selfishness and 
sacrifice, egocentricity and value-centricity etc. As these 
features are amenable to multiple possible interpretations, 
so we have various philosophical responses, metaphysical 
formulations, axiological orientations and even 
epistemological starting-points. And thus emerges . the 
phenomenon of wide-spread philosophical disagreement. 
Philosophers become idealists, materialists, theists, 
atheists, pantheists, deists, deontologists, teleologists, 
rationalists, intuitionists, empiricists and offer varying as 
well as differing world-views and value-systems. Philosophers 
have been arguing for and against these conflicting thesis 
for thousands of years and there is nothing to show that 
philosophical disagreement will ever cease to be. Besides 
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the amenability of the features of the cosmic and human 
situation, our very ontocosmological and axiological inter-
pretations may be rooted in various conceptual fields, 
cultural frames, environmental factors and historical 
experiences. And, in view of the same, adjudication of 
philosocial conflicts becomes all the more unmanageable. 
However, does the above philosophical field-situation 
necessarily lead to absurdism and nihilism. That does not 
seem to be necessarily warranted. There are no cutting or 
definitive reasons to prove that the universe is ontically 
absurd. Similarly, we can never conclusively demonstrate the 
validity of ethical nihilism. Methods such as logical deduc-
tion and empirical verification can never settle 
philosophical issues. Reasons and arguments can be coined and 
paraded in support of any metaphysical contention, 
theological persuasion or axiological position. Arguments can 
be advanced in support of differing philosophical standpoints; 
Absurdism and Nihilism, Idealism and Materialism, Buddhism 
and Christianity etc. philosophers are not called upon to 
make difficult decisions. They are destined to face 
impossible questions. If Absurdism and Nihilism could be 
conclusively demonstrated to be true, the age-old but 
ever-green journey of philosophy could still come to a happy 
end. However, Absurdism and Nihilism are not philosophical 
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conclusions but interpretations. Interpretations may come and 
interpretations may go, but philosophy seems destined to go 
on for ever. Camus' literary insights and formulations have a 
point. However, like a good philsopher, he does not succeed 
in showing the cosmic drama to be pointless. 
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